The Doctrine of God ✠

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THEOLOGICAL OUTLINES.

VOLUME I.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

BY THE

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IN THE
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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

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TO THE

RT. REV. WM. E. McLAREN, D.D., D.C.L.,

BISHOP OF CHICAGO,

TO WHOM THE AUTHOR IS MORE

INDEBTED THAN HE IS

ABLE TO EXPRESS,

THIS BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY

DEDICATED.

PREFACE.

This volume is intended to be the first of a series of text books, written from the Anglo-Catholic stand point, and covering the field of Positive Dogmatics and Polemics. If this intention is carried out, the following subjects will be treated of in the series: In Positive Dogmatics, — the Science of Theology, the Dogmatic Office of the Church, Holy Scripture, Theism, Anti-Theistic Theories, Theology Proper, Creation, Angelology, Anthropology, Christology, Pneumatology, Ecclesiology, and Eschatology: In Polemics, — Anglicanism and the Thirty Nine Articles, the Roman Controversy, the Protestant Controversy, and Church Unity. It is intended to issue one volume each year until the series is completed. There may be four volumes. The writer does not know of any similar work suitably adapted to fulfil the end in view.

The catechetical method has been adopted because it is the most lucid one, where the statements are so condensed; and condensation is necessary for a theological text book.

It is impossible to enter into lengthy arguments or discussions in such Outlines as these, but references will accompany each important question, so that any student who desires to do so can examine further. These references will, in a majority of instances, be found to establish the position assumed by the writer; but the principle of their

selection is to open the way for *further study* of the questions with which they are given.

The writer will be thankful for any friendly criticisms. He can hardly expect to avoid all mistakes, and his work will, no doubt, have many imperfections. It is his desire to conform, in all respects, to the Catholic Faith; — that Faith which was "once for all delivered to the saints," and which is "taught in the Holy Scriptures, summed up in the Creeds, and affirmed by the undisputed General Councils" By that standard he would have his statements criticised and, when necessary, corrected.

The writer begs leave to acknowledge the kind assistance of the Rev. Wm. J. Gold, S. T. D., and Mr. Thos. J. Curran, for which he feels under much obligation; also the generosity of those friends whose subscriptions have encouraged him to publish this volume.

O Almighty God, Who hast built Thy Church upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the Head Cornerstone; Grant us so to be joined together in unity of spirit by their doctrine, that we may be made an Holy Temple acceptable unto Thee; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

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PART I.—INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY.

Question 1.

What is Theology?—Theology (*Θεός*, God; *λόγος*, discourse) is the science of Divine Things. *Hooker's Ec. Pol., III. 8. 11: Fleming's Vocab. of Phil: Pearson, De Deo, p. 1.*

2. A science (a.) treats of ascertained facts,—*i. e.* it is a department of *learning:* (b.) its contents are arranged *systematically,* for greater convenience and for more *connected* study. Theology *is* a department of learning, and its contents *can* be and *have* been arranged systematically. It is, therefore, a science. *Newman's Idea of a University, Disc. 2: Seminarian 1886, 3d paper.*

3. Theology treats of all things which pertain to God;—His nature and operations; His creatures and providential government; His dealings with creaturehood, and His designs, and the historical

facts and institutions which reveal and fulfil them; the future for which He is preparing all things, and the principles and laws of conduct which, as a consequence, it is the duty of man to obey.

4. These elements are partly natural and partly supernatural. They lie partly *within* the range of our natural faculties and partly *beyond,* so as to require the aid of grace for their proper mastery.

QUESTION 2.

WHAT IS THE SUPERNATURAL?—The Supernatural, *theologically* speaking, is that which surpasses the normal order of the visible universe, including man, being neither a part of it nor subject to its conditions or powers. The natural lies within the visible order, and is subject to its conditions and limited by its powers.

2. There is also a philosophical use of the term supernatural, by which everything which is *conscious* and *free* is included in its application. The natural then signifies that which is *unconscious* and subject to a law which impels it *by necessity,* in one determined direction, from without. Man, by original constitution, is therefore supernatural. See *Bushnell's Nat'l and the Sup'l, Ch. 2.* This

use of the terms in question is perfectly valid and is common in Apologetics, but it does not apply in Positive Dogmatics, to such phrases as supernatural revelation, supernatural inspiration, supernatural grace, etc., where the thought of something super-*human* is implied. cf. *Gore's Bamp. Lec. II.*

3. We must distinguish between the natural and the supernatural orders of Divine operation, for much Biblical and theological language will otherwise be unintelligible. But there can be no opposition between them. It is God that worketh, whether He employs natural forces, or supernatural ones, or both.

Question 3.

What is a Miracle?—A miracle is a supernatural event which constitutes an exception to the normal order of sensible phenomena, and, for that reason, excites wonder and awe. *Mozley's, Bamp. Lec. esp. I, II: Temple's Bamp. Lec. VII: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 73-77: Fisher's Grounds of Belief, Ch. IV: Man'l of Evid., Ch. 2.*

2. In the New Testament a miracle is called

either σημεῖον, sign; or τέρας, portent; or δύναμις, power. *Fisher's Evid. p. 10.*

3. The exceptional character of a phenomenon called miraculous is not due, properly speaking, to a *suspension* of the natural order, but arises from the fact that supernatural forces *supplement* the natural ones and thus produce a phenomenon which the latter could not produce alone. God works in and through nature even when his work transcends its limitations. *Fisher's Grounds, pp. 108, 109: Evidences, pp. 11-13* (who points out the analogy between Divine miracles and the free activity of man in nature).

4. The *natural* manifests a particular stage, of temporary character, in the visible work of God. The *supernatural* reveals and furthers the larger plan or *moral purpose* of God in its progressive fulfilment. The *miraculous* (a.) vindicates the Divine order, disturbed by sin. *Gore's Bamp. Lec. pp. 48-51:* (b.) draws attention to and attests the supernatural, and its teaching. *Mozley's Bamp. Lec., I: Fisher's Evid. pp. 19, 20:* (c.) Signifies a new step in the accomplishment of God's plan. *Gore, pp. 52, 53.*

Question 4.

What is natural law?—Natural law signifies the observed uniformity in the conjunction and sequence of given groups of phenomena.

2. Natural law does not signify what *must* happen forever, but what *does* happen now, so far as experience extends. The *"uniformity of nature"* is a *hypothesis* which assumes that events will continue to happen as they have happened. There can be no demonstration of this. *Temple's Bamp. Lec. I: Mozley's Bamp. Lec. II: Fisher's Evid. pp. 13, 14.*

3. Historical evidence shows that the present order of phenomena has been subject to miraculous exceptions; and we learn from the revelations which these miracles attest that this order will, in due time, give place to a new one. *Mozley's Bamp. Lec. V: McLaren's Cath. Dog. Antidote of Doubt, c. 3: Fisher's Evid. c. IV-XI.*

4. We learn from revelation and natural experience that the works of God are usually *regular* both in nature and the supernatural. But the uniformity and unity of the *super*natural was appreciated long before that of nature. Theological science is more ancient than physical sci-

ence—in fact, the mother of it. *A. Moore's criticism of Drummond's Nat'l Law, in Science and the Faith, esp. pp. 13, 14.*

5. But theological science dwells upon its uniformities—e. g. the sacramental laws of grace—chiefly with reference to their moral purpose. Physical science is concerned more with the uniformities themselves. *A. Moore, ibid. p. 8.*

6. Ascertained uniformities, so long as they continue, represent the conditions under which character is formed and men are to serve their probation in this life. This is true of the laws both of nature and of supernatural grace. *Temple's Bamp. Lec. III. pp. 90-96.* For the rel. of Prayer to law, see *Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 184-187.*

QUESTION 5.

WHAT FACULTIES MUST BE EMPLOYED BY A STUDENT OF THEOLOGY?—The faculties of reason and faith must be employed by a student of theology.

2. By reason is not meant the intellect merely, but every psychical faculty. All of them—the intellect, the emotions, and the will—have to do

with the acquirement of religious knowledge. *Flint's Theism, pp. 68-71, 351-355: McLaren's Inner Proof's of God, pp. 10, 11: Cath. Dog. an Antidote of Doubt, c. 2: Gladstone's Church Prin. pp. 40-54.*

3. By faith is meant a supernatural endowment, by which the mind is enabled to perceive the truth and bearing of those spiritual things which surpass the capacity of man's natural understanding. It is not an independent faculty so much as an elevation of the natural understanding by Divine grace. *Blunt's Dic. of Theol. "Faith:" Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 15-18: Flint's Theism, pp. 356-358: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., pp. 346, 347: Ewer's Holy Spirit, pp. 103-106.*

4. To exercise the faculty of faith is an intellectual act, which results—not in mere opinion, but—in the same sort of certainty as do other intellectual acts. The same fundamental assumption is present in all cases, viz. that the faculty employed is trustworthy. It is of course, possible to arrive at mere opinions through the supernatural intelligence, as well as through the natural; but knowledge can be distinguished from opinion in one case as well as in the other. *Flint's Theism. pp. 85, 86: Seminarian, 3d paper.*

5. Faith is not possessed by all, nor in equal measure by those who have it. Its reality can be proved to one who denies its existence by testimony only. *Lux Mundi, 1st paper, pp. 7-11 Hooker's Ec. Pol., V. 63. 2: Seminarian 3d paper.*

6. The energizing principle of an accurate faith is the supernatural life of Grace. This is given in Baptism, and nourished and developed in the Catholic Church as organized with the Apostolic Ministry and succession. Yet a measure of faith is imparted to all who respond to the motions of prevenient grace, whether they are afforded the opportunity of enjoying any or all of the benefits of God's Kingdom or not. *Liddon's Some Elements, p. 71: Ewer's Holy Spirit pp. 27-31, 125-149: Stanton's Place of Authority, p. 105.*

7. There is a substantial unity of belief in all the widely sundered Communions of the Catholic Church. This unity is so close that Greek, Latin and Anglican alike employ three common Creeds, with but slight verbal variations, to express their faith—the Apostles, Nicene and Athanasian symbols. Such a "common consent" is significant, in view of the diversity of races and usages

which exists, and the age-long mutual hostility which has prevailed. Such consent is not to be found elsewhere (Q. XI. 2).

Question 6.

What are the chief sources of theological data?—The chief sources of theological data are (a.) the *physical sciences,* so far as they indicate the existence and attributes of God and the manner of Divine operations. *Hooker's Ec. Pol. I. 8. 3:* (b.) *Anthropology,* so far as it treats of the moral and religious nature and history of man: (c.) the *testimony* of the *Catholic Church* to revealed truth, contained in her Sacred Scriptures, summed up in the Creeds, and affirmed by the undisputed general councils. *Lambeth Conference.*

2. The original source of knowledge concerning such truths as surpass our natural ability to discover is a series of progressive and supernatural revelations from God through His prophets and Incarnate Word, attested by miracles. But the immediate source of such knowledge on *our* part is the testimony of the Church, which has been constituted "the pillar and ground of the truth." This testimony does not take the place of the Sacred Scriptures, but furnishes us with a

sure guide to their doctrinal interpretation. *Palmer on the Church, Pt. III. ch. III, and V.*

3. The testimony or "voice" of the Church is to be ascertained primarily from the Apostles, Nicene, and Athanasian Symbols, which furnish the *premesis* of Christian thought (*præambulæ fidei*).

4. The Creeds do not set the *bounds* of Christian thought, but furnish it with proper points of departure. Christian thought is true "free thought," as opposed to all that is falsely so called. *Emergency Tracts No. 4: Hooker's Ec. Pol. V. 63. 1: Gladstone's Church Prin. pp. 501-504.*

5. The Creeds do not *explicitly* contain all that the Church teaches, nor all that her members are under obligations to believe. She utters her "voice" in various ways,—in the decrees of her undisputed *General Councils* and at all times, in her unformulated *common consent;* but especially in her *Liturgy, Ecclesiastical Calendar,* and other *permanent institutions.* The true theologian must study all of these, and the writings of the great Catholic Doctors of all ages, in order to avoid error. *Stanton's Place of Authority, pp.*

175-187: Pearson, De Deo, I. pp. 3-5: Hooker's Ec. Pol., VIII, 2.17: Owen's Dog. Theol. pp. 50-63.

Question 7.

What are the chief divisions of theology? —The chief divisions of theology are Historical, Systematic, and Exegetical Theology.

2. In Historical theology we study the development of human knowledge concerning Divine things, whether by means of revelation or human effort; the conflict between truth and error; the origin and historical significance of the dogmatic formularies of the Church; and the general course of Christian thought and action.

3. In Systematic theology the materials furnished by Historical theology are arranged in logical order, for fuller and more connected study and for practical application. It is divided into Dogmatic and Moral theology.

4. In Exegetical theology, the truths and principles which are taught by the Church and arranged in Systematic theology, are established and illustrated by a critical analysis and interpretation of the contents of Holy Scripture.

Theology. { Historical. / Systematic. { Dogmatic. / Moral. } / Exegtical. }

QUESTION 8.

WHAT IS DOGMATIC THEOLOGY?—Dogmatic theology includes the arrangement and logical exposition of Divine facts, and the refutation of error and unbelief concerning them.

2. It is called *Dogmatic* because its premises are the dogmas of the Church.

3. Dogmatic theology has three divisions. *Positive Dogmatics,* which is concerned with the arrangement and exposition of Divine facts simply; *Polemics,* which is concerned with the refutation of error concerning these facts; *Apologetics,* which is concerned with the refutation and conviction of infidels.

4. Our present work pertains to Positive Dogmatics, although it will be impossible, of course, to exclude polemical or apologetical material entirely.

- Dogmatic Theology.
  - Positive Dogmatics.
    - Introduction.
    - Theology Proper.
    - Cosmology.
    - Angelology.
    - Anthropology.
    - Christology.
    - Pneumatology.
    - Ecclesiology.
    - Eschatology.
  - Polemics.
  - Apologetics.

CHAPTER II.

DOGMA.

Question 9.

What is dogma?—Dogma (δόγμα, authoritative teaching) is an authoritative formulation of truth. *Martensen's Dog. §1: Owen's Dog. Theol. p. VI.: Moberley in Lux Mundi, pp. 220-229: Garbett's Dogmatic Faith, pp. 13-16.*

2. Catholic dogmas are concerned with the facts of revelation, and are framed by the Church for the purpose of affording explicit, accurate, and exclusive statements concerning them, for the guidance of the faithful in the midst of error. They have the authority of the Church which sets them forth or receives them. *Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 24-29: Bamp. Lec. pp. 3, 4, 443-447.*

3. Some dogmas are framed by General Councils and thus are *decreed* by the whole Church. Some are not thus set forth, but are *received* by the whole Church. In either case the obliga-

tion to receive them is the same. *Gore's Ro. Cath. Claims, pp. 52, 53: Palmer on the Church, Pt. IV. ch. V and VII.*

4. It is one thing to hold the faith *implicitly* and another to state it *explicitly*, or receive it in the form in which it is explicitly stated. The faithful are under obligation to receive all the teachings of the Church implicitly, however set forth. They must also receive all explicit dogmas of the Church, so far as they are in a position to ascertain what those dogmas are. *Dix's Authority of the Church, Lec. I. and II: Pusey's Responsibility of Intellect in Matters of Faith.*

QUESTION 10.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THE CHURCH'S AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE HER DOGMATIC OFFICE?—The basis of the Church's authority to exercise her dogmatic office is partly her own nature, partly the perpetual guidance of the Holy Ghost vouchsafed to her, and partly the commission which has been given to her Ministers to disciple all nations. *39 Arts. XX: Stanton's Place of Auth'ty, esp. ch. I, II, IV: Forbes' 39 Arts. XX: Palmer on the Church, Pt. III. ch. 5: Pt. IV. ch.*

I-VII: Garbett's Dogmatic Faith, esp. Lec. I: Salmon's Infall. of the Ch.

2. The Church is the Body of Christ, indissolubly united to her Head, the Word of God. She is thus the Word *Incorporate*, in whom no one who earnestly seeks can fail to find the Word Incarnate, the Light of the world. *Ewer's Holy Spirit, pp. 45-47.*

3. Our Lord promised that the Holy Ghost should guide His Church into all truth. It is true that she incorporates fallible men into herself, and that they do not cease to be fallible, in this life, even when assembled in Ecclesiastical Councils; but, in her corporate capacity, she is always "the pillar and ground of the truth" to those who are faithful to her life. Multitudes of her members and Ministers may fall away, but the gates of hell can never *prevail* against her. *Stanton's Place of Authority, p. 105 (on the spiritual aptitude of Churchmen): Gore's R. Cath. Claims, pp. 69, 70.*

4. In order to disciple all nations successfully, the Church must at all times make known the actual contents of her message to those who are ready to receive her teaching. Therefore, when

the prevalence of error threatens to defeat this object, she is compelled to put forth plain statements of the truth and to stamp them with her formal authority. *Mozley's Lec. and Theol. Papers VI., on the Dogmatic Office: Ewer's Holy Spirit, pp. 62-65.*

5. It will be seen that the Church does not exercise her dogmatic office in order to *repress* or set the bounds of thought, but to *protect* her faithful ones from erroneous thought. She furnishes *guides* to true thinking, not substitutes for it. *Stanton pp. 187-190.*

6. The Church was established in order that she might bear witness to the Resurrection and other facts of the Gospel. These facts cannot be known *now* except by testimony—i. e. on *authority.* The Church is the only living thing capable of giving this testimony. Her life spans the interval between the Resurrection and our own day; and, as the only contemporary witness now surviving, she is the only available authority which is sufficient to substantiate our belief in the facts of the Gospel. *Stanton, pp. 163-167: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, VIII. 5.*

QUESTION 11.

WHAT IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH?—The Catholic Rule of Faith, by which the contents of the Church's doctrine necessary to be received are determined, is best stated by St. Vincent of Lerins, as follows: "In the Catholic Church we must take great care to hold what has been believed everywhere, always, and by all." In ipsa item Catholica Ecclesia magnopere curandum est, ut id teneamus quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est. *Comm. c. 3. McLaren's Cath. Dogma an Antidote of Doubt, Ch. 15, 16: Luckock's After Death, c. 1: Stanton's Place of Auth'ty., pp. 167-175: Pusey's Rule of Faith: Records of the church, XXIV, XXV (in Tracts for the Times Vol. II): Tracts for the Times, Vol. IV, No. 78:*

2. The first mark of any necessary part of the Catholic Faith is *universality*, by which is meant that it is held in all parts of the Church (Q. V. 7). *Ewer's Holy Spirit, pp. 65-72.*

3. The second mark is *antiquity*, by which is meant—not merely that the *primitive* Church held it, but—that it has been held in the Church from the beginning *until now*. The Church's

voice is uttered in every age, and it has the same authority whether the Church *collective* or the Church *diffusive* is speaking. But the Church teaches only that which she has received—the Faith once for all delivered—and novelty is a proof of error. *Gore's R. Cath. Claims, c. 3.*

4. The third mark is *consent,* by which is meant its reception by all, or nearly all, Catholic theologians. *Gore's R. Cath. Claims, pp. 46, 47.*

QUESTION 12.

WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIALS OF THE FAITH?—The essentials of the Faith include every doctrine of the Church, known to be contained or necessarily implied in her original despositum of truth, and nothing more or less.

2. The distinction often made between *essential* and *non-essential* truth is misleading. The apparent insignificance of a truth cannot make it less essential to be believed, if it is known to have been revealed by God; nor is the obligation to hold such a doctrine as that of the Incarnation any more imperative than that of accepting any other article of the Catholic Faith. The only circumstance which warrants our calling a doctrine

non-essential is its *uncertainty. Emergency Tracts No. 23, p. 1: Hooker's Serm. II. 32: Palmer on the Church, Pt. I. Ch. V. app. esp. pp. 129, 130.*

3. There are certain theories of the schools which are called *pious opinions* or *dubia.* These are non-essential because they are uncertain. They may be true or not. They cannot be proved by Holy Scripture, and the Church does not require them of any man that they should be believed as articles of the Faith. *Gore's R. Cath. Claims, p. 66: Palmer on the Church, Pt. I. ch. IV. §3: Pt. IV. ch. VI.*

4. No one can be justly assailed because of his attachment to a "pious opinion," unless it can be demonstrated that that opinion is inconsistent with some portion of the Catholic Faith.

QUESTION 13.

IS A DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE LEGITIMATE?—A development of Catholic doctrine is not legitimate, in the sense of an increase in its substance; but it is both legitimate and necessary in the sense of (a.) profounder analysis: (b.) larger statement: (c.) richer application: and (d.)

apologetical adjustment of language. *S. Vincent Lir. Comm. c. 23: Gore's Rom. Cath. Claims, c. 3, pp. 53-55: Mozley on Development: Blenkinsopp on Development* (*very suggestive but crude*): *Stanton's Place of Auth'ty., pp. 128-138, 168-170: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., pp. 435-441, 448-450: Palmer's Doc. of Devel. and Conscience, c. VI-VIII.*

2. The Faith once delivered and held by the Church from the beginning contains, either explicitly or by necessary implication, all that man can learn of revealed truth in this life. But the Holy Ghost is ever guiding the Church into a deeper appreciation and *fuller consciousness* of the truth. The studies of her theologians are continually bringing to light *new* treasures as well as old, such as were not realized *in detail* before. The meaning of the Sacred Scriptures can be more fully ascertained now than ever before, but "the latest age has not exhausted the meaning of what was once said." *Westcott's Revel. of the Risen Lord, p. 160.*

3. Ecclesiastical statements of doctrine develop along with the development of Christian consciousness. The Church's explicit Faith is continually embracing larger areas of her implicit

Faith. The growth of the Creeds from the baptismal formula illustrates this, as does also the gradual increase in the richness of Catholic theology.

4. The relation and application of revealed truth to human life and its conditions cannot but be more adequately understood in the Church as the stores of her practical experience increase. The science of Moral Theology cannot be permanently crystalized. *Temple's Bamp. Lec. V. pp. 146, 147.* Moreover, every development of the sciences of nature and of man must put the Church in a better position to perceive the bearing of revealed truth.

5. New forms of thought, and, therefore, of unbelief and assault upon the Faith, are continually appearing. In order to meet them, Catholic theologians must translate the old truths into new language, and employ such forms of thought and argument as are likely to meet the difficulties of the willing and the sophistries of the unwilling. This does not involve an adjustment of the Faith but of its *presentation.* Nor does it justify a surrender of the Catholic Creeds or Sacred Scriptures, but only an *explanation* of their meaning, in view of contemporary thought.

6. Illegitimate developments arise from (a.) treating as essential what is only "pious opinion:" (b.) undue emphasis of isolated parts of the Faith. This last is the characteristic mistake of *heresy*, which signifies making a *private choice* of what to accept. It involves necessarily a denial of some other part. *Richey's Truth and Counter Truth, p. iii. Blunt's Dic. of Sects, "Heretics."*

CHAPTER III.

HOLY SCRIPTURE.

Question 14.

What is the Bible?—The Bible is a series of "Sacred Scriptures," written by holy men of old, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost; which has been compiled and preserved by the Church for the edification of the faithful, as "the Word of God," and a means by which every doctrine can be proved which she requires of men as necessary for salvation. *39 Arts. VI: Forbes' 39 Arts., VI; Hooker's Ec. Pol., I. 12-15: Richey's What is the Bible.*

2. The Bible consists of a *series* of Scriptures which were written under diverse circumstances, by different writers, in different ages, and for a variety of immediate purposes. But the impulse which moved every writer came from the same source. A unity of purpose governs the whole series. "The Old Testament is not contrary to the New · · · everlasting life is offered to mankind

by Christ," in both. *39 Arts. VII. Lee on Inspiration pp. 11-17: Forbes' 39 Arts., VII:*

3. The impulse by which the sacred writers were moved is called *inspiration,* and came directly from the Holy Ghost; but the authority by which that inspiration is *attested* is the Catholic Church, without whose aid the Sacred Scriptures could not have been distinguished with certainty from other writings of holy men, nor, in view of the mistakes of copyists, preserved from doctrinal corruption. The Church is the witness and keeper of Holy Writ. *Lee on Inspiration pp. 33-36: Stanton's Place of Auth'ty., pp. 74-80: 160-162: Wordsworth on Insp., pp. 32-69, 82-88: Hooker's Eccl. Pol. III. 8. 13, 14.*

4. The Sacred Scriptures were written from the point of view of God's Kingdom, and for the members of it; to establish and strengthen them in the doctrine which they had learned or were in a position to learn in that Kingdom. *Tertul. De Prescrip. Her. 19 et seq: Gore's R. Cath. Claims pp. 57, 58.*

5. The Bible not only *contains* the Word of God, but, in its integrity, *is* the Word of God. Every part is Divinely inspired and is of equal

authority, when interpreted in accordance with its organic relation to the whole course of revelation. *Lee, p. 20.*

6. The Bible is not the *source* of truth for God's kingdom, for the Church's possession of it is more ancient than the Bible, and was derived from direct revelation. But the Bible is useful to *prove* what the Church *teaches*. It is often the means also by which *individuals* discover the true religion. The Church and the Bible are both necessary. Both are Divine and we may not separate or mutually oppose them in our study of theology. *Forbes' 39 Arts. VI. pp. 93-95: Gore's R. Cath. Claims, pp. 60-64: S. Basil on the H. Sp. XVII. 66, 67.*

QUESTION 15.

WHAT TWO ELEMENTS SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED IN THE SACRED SCRIPTURES?—The *Divine* and the *human* elements should be distinguished in the Sacred Scriptures: one due to the inspiration of their authors, the other due to the fact that this inspiration did not emancipate the sacred writers from human limitations. *Lee on Inspiration, pp. 18-21: 141-145: Wordsworth on Insp., pp. 5-7.*

2. The Divine inspiration guarantees the absolute trustworthiness of the Sacred Scriptures in all religious and moral questions, and their profitableness for doctrine, reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness. Moreover the Church is enabled, by the guidance of the Holy Ghost, to preserve the Bible from any corruption which would defeat the purpose for which its authors were inspired.

3. Yet the sacred writers were human even when inspired. They were not universally infallible, nor is it necessary to suppose that they received greater supernatural enlightenment than was needed to enable them to fulfil the religious and moral purpose for which they were inspired. That purpose did not include a revelation concerning secular history, physical science, or natural things. Whatever learning of such sort is displayed is *human* learning and is subject to its *limitations*. Furthermore, Divine providence has not enabled the Church to preserve or recover the exact letter of the original text, or to provide absolutely accurate translations. The preservation of the Divine element has not required this.

4. The Divine and human elements are inseparably united in one Holy Scripture. They cannot

be separated, nor is it possible to draw a line between them or say that this passage is human and that Divine. Every part of the Bible, in its proper relation, is divinely inspired, and every part is human.

5. Yet we may not confound the two elements. We may not impute omniscience or universal infallibility to the human writers, nor may we admit the possibility of error in the religious and moral message they were inspired to convey. The religious inspiration and the human limitation must both be acknowledged in their integrity.

QUESTION 16.

WHAT ARE THE CHIEF THEORIES OF INSPIRATION, AND THEIR SANCTION?—The chief theories of inspiration are the *verbal,* the *doctrinal,* the *neologian,* and the *dynamic.* The Church has not formulated or sanctioned any one of them. *Lee on Inspiration pp. 18-26.*

2. The *verbal* theory is that God so inspired the sacred writers that every word which they wrote was selected absolutely by the Holy Ghost and not by themselves. Such a theory empties the human element of all reality, and makes it diffi-

cult, if not impossible, to allow any authority to modern texts and translations. *Lee, pp. 18, 19.*

3. The *doctrinal* theory acknowledges that the sacred writers were inspired to write true doctrine, but denies that the particular *form* of their writings had any other than a human source. Against this must be set the evidence that many of the very words of the Bible were Divinely selected—e. g. Father, Son, Holy Ghost, Messias, ransom, propitiation, and many others. We cannot determine just how far this verbal inspiration extends. Moreover there is often an "inspiration of selection," by virtue of which human materials are chosen and shaped in the manner best adapted to the Divine purpose. *Liddon's Univ. Sermons Second Series, XX: Lee, pp. 32, 33.*

4. The *Neologist* identifies the inspiration of the sacred writers with that spiritual insight and wisdom which is possessed by all righteous men who possess great natural gifts. Inspiration is attributed to such men as Socrates, Luther, and Keble. Thus inspiration is a matter of *degree* and is purely *natural*. This theory empties the word inspiration of all meaning, and is inconsistent with the unique and supernatural character of the Bible. *Lee, pp. 19-21.*

5. The *dynamic* theory is, that the writers of the Bible had their spiritual faculties quickened and enlarged by the Holy Ghost, without losing their literary freedom or the peculiarities of their style. This undoubtedly represents the truth in many instances, but, in some cases, the nature of the writing appears to require no peculiar illumination or spiritual power;— e. g. the Book of Ruth, where the inspiration seems to have been merely an *impulse* to write, and an *over ruling* of the process so as to impart a meaning to the result which the writer and his contemporaries knew little or nothing of. The Holy Ghost often *co-operates*, rather than empowers. *Lee, pp. 21-26, 141-145: Westcott's Introd. to the Study of the Gospels, Introd.*

6. The variety of the work of the Holy Ghost in inspiration is such that no attempt to generalize is likely to be successful or lessen difficulties. It is sufficient to insist upon the *fact* of inspiration and its unique and plenary character; acknowledging, at the same time, the reality of the human element.

Question 17.

What should inspiration be distinguished from?—Inspiration should be distinguished from revelation. *Lee on Inspiration, pp. 7-9, 27-31, 145-148: Stanton's Place of Auth'ty, pp. 71, 72.*

2. All parts of the Sacred Scriptures are inspired, but some portions are not revelations. For example, the greater portion of the Apocalypse consists of a revelation concerning the consummation of things; but the book of Ezra is not a revelation so much as a narrative of events connected with the return of the Jews from Babylon. Yet both books are equally inspired and are given to us for our religious instruction. *Lee, pp. 145-148.*

3. It is important to notice, in this connection, that the *revealer* of all things is the *Eternal Word,* whether those things are recorded in the Old or the New Testament. *Lee, pp. 7-9.*

4. But the source of *inspiration* is the *Holy Ghost.* By His aid the sacred writers were able to give us a true account of the revelations which proceeded from the Son, and to write *whatever* scriptures were intended to be preserved by the Church for our profit—whether in the form of narrative,

drama, prophecy, parable, exposition, or exhortation. *Lee, pp. 9-11, 115-133, 31, 32.*

5. An examination of Holy Scripture shows that the revelations which it records were *progressive;* being adapted to the ability of men to receive them, and becoming more explicit with the lapse of ages and the advance of the religious education of God's people. Thus it happens that, while the New Testament is latent in the Old and the Old implies the New, some doctrines of the New Testament cannot be proved by the Old Testament alone. *Temple's Bamp. Lec. V. pp. 136-158: Mozley's Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, Lec. X: Gore in Lux Mundi, pp. 328-332.*

6. The records of earlier revelations should be read in the light of later and more explicit ones. And, since the contents of all revelations recorded in Holy Scripture are embodied in "the Faith once delivered to the saints," of which the Catholic Church is the teacher and guardian, we should use her teaching as the only true key to the doctrinal interpretation of the Bible.

PART II.—THEOLOGY PROPER.

CHAPTER IV.

THEISM.

Question 18.

What is Theology Proper? — Theology Proper is that part of Positive Dogmatics which is concerned with the doctrine of God,—His existence, nature, attributes, subsistence, and operations.

2. The following order will be observed in these outlines:

(a.) Theism ; or the proofs of the existence of God and their teaching.

(b.) Revelation and its relation to Theism.

(c.) Anti-Theistic theories.

(d.) The Quiescent attributes; or the Nature of God.

(e.) The active attributes.

(f.) The Trinity.

(g.) Divine Economy or the external operations of God.

QUESTION 19.

WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEMONSTRATION AND MORAL PROOF? — *Demonstration* proceeds from necessary and universal (a priori) truths, and deduces particular conclusions which necessarily follow. *Moral proof,* also called probable proof, proceeds from premises which are at least credible and exhibits a *preponderance* of argument in favor of its conclusions. *Pearson De Deo, Lec. III. p. 23.*

2. Demonstration produces apodeictic (Mathematical) certainty. Its conclusions cannot be evaded. The opposite of a demonstrated proposition is not only false but *impossible to conceive. Fleming's Vocab. "Demonstration:" Fisher's Evid., p. 5.*

3. Moral proof produces moral certainty. Its conclusions can be evaded, through moral perversity. The opposite of the morally certain is possible to conceive, but, properly speaking, *incredible. Fleming's Vocab. "Probability:" Fisher's Evid. p. 5.*

4. Probable proof is fitly called moral, because its persuasiveness depends upon *moral conditions.* It is rarely successful with the unwilling. Yet one becomes responsible, when in possession of moral proof, for every evil which results from ignoring its conclusions. *Hooker's Ec. Pol., II. 7. 5: Butler's Anal., Introd. p. 72: Pt. II. ch. 6, pp. 261, 262.*

5. Religious certainty is based upon moral proof. All the faculties of the soul are required for its proper acquirement:—the *intellect,* or logical faculty; the *affections,* or sympathetic and appreciative faculty; the *will* or attentive faculty, which also tests by moral experience. A refusal to exercise either faculty renders one accountable for error (Q. V. 2). *McLaren's Inner Proofs of God, pp. 9-11: Liddon's Some Elements, Lec. I: Flint's Theism, pp. 2-4.*

QUESTION 20.

CAN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD BE DEMONSTRATED?—The existence of God cannot be demonstrated, for there is no prior premise, independently necessary, from which that conclusion can be drawn. *Pearson De Deo, II. pp. 12-16: Clem. Alex. Strom. Bk. IV. ch. 12. p. 464.*

2. "The being of God is the primal truth . . . . There is nothing before it nor apart from it, from which it is to be derived . . . . . In every mode of demonstration whose object is to arrive at it, it is assumed." *Mulford's Repub. of God, pp. 1-5.*

3. We cannot see God with our unaided faculties (John I. 18). *Pearson De Deo, Lec. XII.* In the absence of demonstration, therefore, we depend upon moral proof and supernatural revelation for our knowledge of Him. *S. Thos. Sum. Theol. I. 2. 1.*

4. God demands and puts us to the probation of a service which is *free*—such as free and rational creatures can give. The knowledge of His existence and nature is a primary part of that service and trial. Such knowledge, therefore, depends upon moral conditions *within ourselves.* No demonstration or revelation is given such as would compel us to believe or do away with effort on our part. *Butler's Anal. II. c. 6, esp. pp. 267 et seq: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 231-234.*

QUESTION 21.

IS THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CAPABLE OF MORAL PROOF?—The existence of God is capable of moral proof; and by means of such proof all can acquire a *moral certainty* that He exists. *Pearson De Deo, II. pp. 17, 18: Flint's Theism, pp. 59-86.*

2. This could not be said without qualification, in view of man's fall, did not God extend to all men such measure of prevenient grace as enables them to appreciate the proofs of His existence, if they will (Acts XVII. 26, 27). *Butler's Anal. II. c. 6. pp. 264, 265: Liddon's Some Elements, p. 71.*

QUESTION 22.

WHAT FACT DOES THE ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD START WITH?—The argument for the existence of God starts with the fact of COMMON CONSENT. All men have had an idea of a Supreme Being on Whom they depend, and have acknowledged His existence. At least, such exceptions as exist can be accounted for, and are of such sort that they prove the rule. *Stanton's Place of Auth'ty., pp. 56-63: Flint's Theism app. note VIII. pp. 348-350: Pearson De Deo, II. pp. 16, 17: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 48,*

49: Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories Lec. VII. and app. notes XXVI-XXXII.

2. Two sorts of men are mentioned as not acknowledging the existence of the Supreme Being, viz. certain savage races, and certain avowed Atheists. Whatever may be the case with the former (*cf. Tylor's Prim. Culture I. 377, 381, 418*), they are so abnormally degraded as to lack many other ideas which rational men commonly possess. The latter are *interested* in denying the existence of God.

3. This common consent can only be accounted for in four ways: (a.) by connatural necessity of such a belief to one constituted as man is: (b.) by the strength of the evidence furnished through the common experiences of men: (c.) by primitive tradition. *Flint's Theism app. Note IV:* (d.) by repeated supernatural revelations.

4. The significance of the fact of common consent is that it shows the *onus probandi* to be with the Atheist rather than with the Theist. *Mason's Faith of the Gospel c. I. §3.* The Atheist must prove that God does *not* exist. To do so he must be omniscient; for, otherwise, it could be alleged that some indication of God's existence

had escaped his notice. In short he must himself be God, which is an absurdity. *Chalmer's Nat. Theol. Vol. I., Bk. 1, c. 2: Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories pp. 8-14, 446-450: Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 143, 144.*

5. It is however desirable to exhibit the argument for the existence of God for three reasons, (a.) to convince genuine seekers after God: (b.) to strengthen the faith of those who believe: (c.) to enrich our knowledge of the nature of God.

QUESTION 23.

WHAT SORTS OF PROOF HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD?—*A priori* and *a posteriori* proof have been employed to prove the existence of God.

2. *A priori* proof reasons from forms of cognition which are seen to be prior to and independent of experience. *A posteriori* proof reasons from empirical premises—drawn from experience. *Fleming's Vocab. "a priori."*

3. Our acquaintance with *a priori* premises is *occasioned* by experience; but our assurance of their validity is intuitive and not drawn from experience.

4. Aristotle and the Scholastics applied the phrase *a priori* to reasoning from cause to effect, and the phrase *a posteriori* to reasoning from effect to cause. *S. Thos. Sum. Theol. I. 2. 2.* The definitions here given have prevailed since the time of Kant. *Fleming's Vocab.*

5. The order of treatment will be, (a.) attempts at *a priori* proof, especially of S. Anselm and Des Cartes: (b.) *a posteriori proofs*, including the cosmological, teleological, historical, and moral.

QUESTION 24.

WHAT IS THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT? — The Ontological argument, which was first formulated by S. Anselm, proceeds as follows: "I have in my mind the idea of the most perfect being conceivable. The most perfect being conceivable must have the attribute of *necessary existence.* One whose existence was contingent would not be the most perfect conceivable. Necessary existence implies actual existence. An absolutely perfect Being therefore actually exists, and He is God. *Given in Norris' Rudiments of Theology p. 18; cf. S. Anselm's Proslog. 2 (in Migne's Patrol T. 158, p. 228): S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 2. 1: Flint's Theism Lec. IX, esp. pp. 278-280 (sustains the*

arg.): Fisher's Grounds of Belief, pp. 39-41: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 49-51: Pearson De Deo II. p. 12.

2. S. Thomas rejects the argument for the following reasons: (a.) it does not appeal to all, for some regard God as a body—not as the greatest Being conceivable; (b.) it begs the question, for the necessity of *thinking* that the most perfect conceivable Being exists is not equivalent to the fact of His existence, nor a demonstration of it. *cf. Pearson De Deo, II. 18-21: Waterland's Dissert. on Arg. a priori, Vol. III. 321 et. seq.*

3. To these objections may be added the further difficulty, that our most perfect conception falls short of the Infinite Being whose existence we desire to prove. *Flint p. 280.*

4. Des Cartes undertook to employ this argument, but was forced by the exigencies of controversy to adopt an *a posteriori* form (see Q. 25). Many attempts at *a priori* proof were also made in the 18th Century. *Flint, app. XXXVIII.*

5. *A priori* proof is formally imperfect; but the attempt to employ it brings to light in a forcible manner (a.) the *connaturalness* of our belief in the existence of God: (b.) the fact that we must

either believe that God exists or else regard the fundamental conditions of human thinking as delusive. The latter alternative is equivalent to an assertion of universal insanity, which would preclude the possibility of any science whatever. *Flint's Theism, pp. 285-288.*

QUESTION 25.

WHAT IS THE ARGUMENT OF DES CARTES?—The argument of Des Cartes is as follows: "We have the idea of an infinitely perfect Being. As we are finite, that idea could not have originated with us. As we are conversant only with the finite, it could not have originated from anything around us. It must, therefore, have come from God, Whose existence is thus a necessary assumption." *Med. de Prim. Philos. prop. II: Hodge's Syst. Theol. Vol. I. 205: Pearson De Deo, III. pp. 27-30.*

2. Des Cartes says elsewhere (*prop. 3, 4.*), "Notiones nostras esse aut adventitias, aut factitias, aut innatas. Ideam de Deo non esse adventitiam, Deum enim non experientia duce reperiri; neque factitiam, nam non arbitrio a nobis affictam esse: ergo esse innatam, sive a Deo ipso nobis suppeditatam."

3. The difference between the argument of S. Anselm and that of Des Cartes is that the former supposes the existence of God to be *involved* in our idea of Him, while the latter *infers* the existence of God *to account for* the idea. *Hodge's Syst. Theol. Vol. I. 206.* The latter is really *a posteriori,* and is subject to the limitations of such arguments. cf. *Bowen's Mod. Philos. p. 27 et seq.*

QUESTION 26.

WHAT IS THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT?—The Cosmological argument proceeds from the phenomena of the universe and their harmony to an Infinite First Cause to account for them. *Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 51-53, 66: Flint's Theism, Lec. IV: Pearson De Deo, III. pp, 30-32: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 2, 3. Hodge's Outlines, pp. 33-35.*

2. "Finite things have not their origin in themselves. We trace effects back to their causes; but these causes are found to be, also, effects. *cf. Flint's Theism, pp. 118-124.* The path is endless. There is no goal. There is no satisfaction, save in the assumption of being that is causative without being caused, or being which

has the ground of existence in itself." *Fisher's Grounds of Belief, pp. 41, 42.*

3. The idea of self-caused being causing all other being, including the personal, suggests naturally and logically the ascription of will and personality to that being. *Fisher ibid: Flint, pp. 129, 130*

4. Two premises are assumed, (a.) that phenomenal events require causality: (b.) that the world is not itself eternal and therefore not self-caused. The former would seem to be axiomatic, but Hume objected that we cannot *observe* causality. What we actually see is succession. Yes, but we intuitively recognize the difference between *mere* succession and the succession of cause and effect, and the reality of causality accounts for this discrimination more satisfactorily than any other hypothesis. *Mozley's Essays Hist. and Theol. pp. 415-444: Flint, pp. 97-101.*

5. The other premise is disputed by the Pantheist, who regards the universe as self-caused and eternal. But, while it is impossible to demonstrate directly the falsity of such a contention, the following considerations militate against its truth: (a.) All history, comparative philology,

and ethnology indicate that the human race is of recent origin: (b.) the evidences of development in nature and of dissipation of heat point back to a beginning of the present order. *Chalmer's Nat. Theol. Bk. I. c. 5: Flint's Theism pp. 101-118: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, ch. I. §4.*

6. Holy Scripture teaches that God can be known through His works (Acts XIV. 15-17: XVII. 22-29: Rom. I. 19, 20).

QUESTION 27.

WHAT IS THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT?—The Teleological argument starts with the evidences of design observable in nature and infers the existence of a Designer of sufficient wisdom to account for them. As Fisher says, "We see a thought realized and thus recognize in it a fore thought,"—and a *Fore-thinker. Grounds of Belief, pp. 42-67: Paley's Nat. Theol., opening chapters: Flint's Theism, Lec. V. VI: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 53-55: Hodge's Outlines, pp. 35-41: MacColl's Christianity in Rel. to Sc. and Morals, pp. 17-21: Norris' Rud. of Theol., pp. 19-21: Mozley's Essays, pp. 363-413: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 2, 3, quinta.*

2. The facts with which this argument

starts are (a.) universal *order* and *adjustment*, as of means to ends: (b.) the unity of nature as seen in the *coincidence* and co-operation of physical causes to the production of single results, and in the general harmony of the ends to which all parts of nature are adapted. *Fisher, p. 43.*

3. Kant raised two objections in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* (a.) the argument proves the existence of an architect or *fashioner* of nature, but not a *Creator* of its material elements. This is true, but all the argument pretends to prove is that the First Cause is intelligent. None the less, it appears propable that He is also the Creator of matter, although for other reasons. Matter cannot be separated from those properties which constitute its adaptibility. *Flint, pp. 170-173.*

4. (b). An Infinite Creator cannot be inferred, strictly speaking, from finite creation however great and wonderful. All that can be insisted upon is a being of inconceivably great power and wisdom. This is also true, but infinity is necessarily involved in the idea of an unconditioned Being. *Fisher, pp. 49, 50. Flint, pp. 174-177.*

5. The alternative of Design is Chance. Lucretius held that the world is the result of a "fortuitous concourse of atoms" But one might as reasonably believe that a haphazard collection of small metallic pieces could, by mere accident, fall on some paper in such wise as to print this volume. *MacColl, p. 19.*

6. The evolutionary hypothesis is not inconsistent with the Teleological argument. It is concerned with the *how*—not the *why*. Gradualness of development does not exclude design. Knowledge of the *process* is not knowledge of the *cause. Flint, pp. 189-209: Fisher, pp. 55, 60, 61: Liddon, p. 54, note: MacColl, p. 20: Temple's Bamp. Lec. IV: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, ch. I. §4.*

7. The Psalmist says (XCIV. 9) "He that made the ear, shall He not hear? And He that gave the eye, shall He not see?" Why not add, "He that made the mind shall he not think?" *Liddon, p. 53.*

QUESTION 28.

WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT?—The Historical argument employs the evidences of design—especially moral design—which are observ-

able in the general course of history, to prove the existence of a supreme, wise and righteous Governor of the physical and moral world. *Flint's Theism, pp. 227-261: Fisher's Grounds of Belief, p. 69: Hodge's Outlines, pp. 42-44.*

2. The theory of evolution, whatever diversities may prevail in the manner of holding and stating it, strengthens this argument greatly; for it indicates that the whole course of nature has been ordered from the beginning with reference to a lofty and spiritual product—the perfect man.

3. In particular, thoughtful men admit that the course of human history exhibits continual progress towards a more and more perfect exhibition of righteousness and goodness. The histories of social life, nations, crime, law, and religions supply abundant evidence of this. Sacred history, whatever may be thought as to its sacredness, reveals the same progress towards the same end.

4. The evidences of physical and moral disorder in the world do not destroy the force of this argument; for (a.) the most they can be said to prove is, that the complete fulfilment of God's design has not yet been attained: (b.) whatever

may be the nature and origin of evil, it *does not defeat* the continual moral progress of the world: (c.) There are indications that God so over rules the forces of evil that He makes them very instruments in accomplishing His own good designs. *Flint, Lec. VIII: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 142-148: Butler's Anal. Pt. I. ch. VII. p. 182: MacColl on the Creed, pp. 57-60.*

QUESTION 29.

WHAT IS THE MORAL ARGUMENT?—The Moral argument proceeds from the sense of accountability and the religious instinct common to all men, and infers that there must be a righteous and personal Ruler and Judge to Whom we are accountable, and Whom we ought to worship. *Strong's Syst. Theol., pp. 45-47: Flint's Theism, pp. 210-226: Fisher's Grounds of Belief, pp. 67-69: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, ch. I. §5: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 67-71: Hodge's Outlines pp. 41, 42.*

2. Men pass judgments upon their neighbors on the assumption that they are accountable *morally*. These judgments are not limited to cases in which the person judging has been injured. There are instances in which the account-

ability can only be satisfied on the assumption that there is a Judge and Punisher Who is over all. Thus men bear witness to their own accountability, and to the existence of Him to Whom they must render account.

3. Butler, in his *Sermons on Human Nature,* says of the conscience, "Had it the power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." But authority presupposes power. The conscience has authority because it witnesses to a law, a purpose, of One Who has the power upon which its own authority must rest. *Strong's Syst. Theol., p. 46: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 66-70.*

4. Religion in some form or other, however debased, is universal; which bears witness to a sense of dependence upon God equally universal. S. Augustine says, *Conf. I. 1,* "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless till it find rest in Thee." *cf. references under Q. 22.*

QUESTION 30.

WHAT IS THE FORCE OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE? — The force of the arguments for God's existence is *cumulative,* and sufficient to produce, in any unprejudiced mind, *a moral cer-*

tainty that He exists. *Flint's Theism, pp. 62-75: Liddon's Some Elements, p. 70: Barry's Boyle Lec. 1876, Lec. III.*

2. Each particular argument is logically imperfect; but each *suggests the hypothesis* of God's existence as the true way to account for the phenomena of the universe. When this hypothesis is once adopted, innumerable lines of evidence are seen to converge upon and corroberate it. While, therefore, the hypothesis is seen to be the "*solution of a problem,*" rather than the conclusion of a demonstration, the fact that it is the *true* solution becomes as certain as any scientific conviction. *Calderwood's Moral Phil. pp. 223-232: Strong's Syst. Theol. p. 50: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, ch. I. §2.*

3. The hypothesis that God exists is known by all: and the *a posteriori* evidence which corroberates it is everywhere exhibited before the eyes of men. Therefore, the sufficiency of evidence for reasonable assurance, coupled with the fact that the Being Whose existence is at issue is a Moral Governor Who demands our worship and service, renders all men accountable who refuse to believe in Him (Rom. I. 18 et seq). *Chalmer's*

Nat. Theol. Bk. I. c. I, II. esp. c. II §16, pp. 72, 73: Dr. Pusey's Responsibility of the Intellect in Matters of Faith.

QUESTION 31.

WHAT DO THE EVIDENCES OF GOD'S EXISTENCE TEACH US CONCERNING HIS ATTRIBUTES? — The evidences of God's existence teach us that He is the uncaused, eternal and infinite Cause and Orderer of all things, One and unique, intelligent, free, and personal, the beneficent and righteous Governor of the world, Whom we should worship and Whose will we should ascertain and obey. *Chalmer's Nat'l. Theol. B'k. V. ch. 4, pp. 358-387: Barry's Boyle Lec. 1876, pp 320 324: Martensen's Dog., §38: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 2. 2. ad sec:*

2. The arguments for the existence of God do not *originate* our faith therein. They justify it, and afford *points of view* from which to contemplate its Object. They show, not simply that God is; but, by drawing our attention to certain inferences which can be gathered from His handiwork, they help us to see *what* He is. *Fisher's Grounds of Belief, p. 37.*

3. The *Cosmological* argument points to One

uncaused First Cause and Orderer of all things. Such a Being must be without beginning, i. e. eternal; and self-conditioned, i. e. infinite. He must also be unique, as supreme, for to suppose two supremes is absurd. *Flint's Theism, pp. 124-129.*

4. The evidences of *Design* in nature show that this First Cause is intelligent and free, therefore personal.

5. The *Historical* argument employs evidences which indicate this wise Person to be beneficent since He over-rules all things for the ultimate good of His creatures.

6. The *Moral* argument draws attention to indications that the Good Being Whom we call God is righteous in all His ways and will not behold iniquity.

7. From the universal prevalence of the religious instinct, and the sense of accountability, we are led to infer that our worship is due to God and that our lives must be conformed to His will, however made known.

CHAPTER V.

REVELATION.

Question 32.

Is man able to acquire sufficient knowledge of God and His will without Divine aid? — Man is not able to acquire sufficient knowledge of God and His will without Divine aid. Such aid is given, however, and is twofold; (a.) Divine grace, which is an internal gift correcting and strengthening the spiritual vision: (b.) supernatural revelation, which is external and objective. *Flint's Theism, Lec. X.*

2. The term revelation signifies, in Theology, a special and supernatural unveiling of truth by God. The word is also used to signify the contents of what is thus unveiled. *Lee on Inspiration, Lec. I: Stanton's Place of Authority, pp. 29-38.*

3. We need supernatural revelation in order (a.) to understand more clearly and with infallible authority what nature itself teaches: (b.) to

gain additional information concerning God's nature and purposes towards us, and concerning the obligations which arise therefrom, more explicit than is otherwise available. *Butler's Analogy Pt. II. c. 1. pp. 193-205: Barry's Boyle Lec. 1876, p. 325: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 72, 73: Fisher's Evid., pp. 22-25: Strong's Syst. Theol., pp. 58, 59: Hodge's Outlines, pp. 58-61: Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, Lec. II.*

4. Revelation does not contradict the indications of Divine truth in nature but gives them *articulate expression,* and *supplements* them. Nature without revelation is largely a moral enigma. *Stanton pp. 36-38: Martensen's Dog., §43.*

5. The science of Theology borrows from the sciences of nature, but only as they are irradiated and supplemented by revelation (cf. Q. 6.) *Martensen's Dog. §44.*

Question 33.

What is Rationalism? — Rationalism is that system or theory which attributes undue authority to reason in matters of religion. It has three forms; (a.) *Deistic,* which denies both the possibility and fact of revelation, making the

unaided reason the ground and source of all religious knowledge: (b.) the theory which admits the possibility and fact of revelation, but asserts that its contents are *within the power of reason to discover and demonstrate apart from their revelation:* (c.) *Dogmatism,* which admits the necessity and authority of revelation, but claims that what is thus received can be philosophically established and explained so as to elevate the thoughtful believer from faith to knowledge. *Hodge's Syst. Theol. Vol. I. pp. 34-49: Hodge's Outlines, pp. 56, 57: Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 190-209.*

2. According to Deism, God so made the world that it is subject to certain laws, and is carried on by secondary causes, with which He neither will nor can interfere. An interference would imply some imperfection in the original work of creation. Such a theory assumes that nature, as originally constituted, is sufficient in itself, and represents the finality of God's external operation. But the physical and moral imperfection of nature, thus interpreted, is a frightful enigma, which must drive the questioner into pessimism or skepticism. *Hodge, pp. 34-39: Christlieb: Farrar's Hist. of Free Thought, Lec. IV: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 55-59.*

3. According to the second form of rationalism, the purpose of revelation is merely to publish more widely and authenticate to the masses, the doctrines of natural religion, discoverable by philosophers without its aid. A cultivated man should believe only what is reasonable, i. e. comprehensible. Holy Scripture *contains* a true revelation, but other things also which are to be rejected as unreasonable. But it is to be noted that (a.) assent is based on evidence rather than comprehension. Even in the natural world we accept what we do not understand: (b.) the multitude cannot rationalize and are cut adrift by this theory. *Hodge, pp. 39-44.*

4. Dogmatism distinguishes between faith, πίστις, which is for the common people who depend upon authority simply; and knowledge, γνῶσις, to which philosophers attain through speculative analysis and logical demonstration of the contents of revelation. This theory (a.) assumes that man can exhaustively analyze and demonstrate such doctrines as the Trinity and Incarnation: (b.) exalts the intellect at the expense of the rest of man's spiritual nature: (c.) disparages the faith of the many, and creates a proud religious aristocracy. *Hodge, pp. 44-49.*

5. All the above forms of rationalism are found among those who affect what is termed "liberal Christianity."

6. Human reason is necessary for religious knowledge (cf. Q. 5), nor ought any thing to be accepted which is really in conflict with it. But (a.) it needs the aid of grace: (b.) it must use all available sources of truth, including revelation: (c.) it must assent, on sufficient evidence, even when comprehension is impossible; for that which surpasses comprehension is not necessarily in conflict with reason. *Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 70-94: Hodge's Outlines, pp. 62-64.*

CHAPTER V.

ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.

Question 34.

What is Atheism?—Atheism is an absolute denial that God exists. *Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, Lec. I: Blackie's Natural Hist. of Atheism: Hodge's Syst. Theol. pp. 241-243: Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 138-144.*

2. There is no reason to charge a man with dishonesty who claims to be an Atheist; but such a person can never be consistent, for he must *act* as if there were a God, however unconscious of the fact he may be. *Flint, pp. 5-8: Hodge, pp. 242, 243.*

3. As has been said already (Q. 22.4), it is impossible for one who is not omniscient—i. e. Divine—to demonstrate the non-existence of God. Furthermore, mere probabilities cannot justify Atheism, for as long as a bare possibility remains that a Moral Governor of the universe exists Whom it is our duty to worship and serve, it is

our duty to study further before denying His existence (Q. 30.3).

QUESTION 35.

WHAT IS AGNOSTICISM? — Agnosticism is that system which denies that God is knowable. *Fisher's Grounds of Belief, pp. 85-102: Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, pp. 14, 15: Iverach's Is God Knowable? Present Day Tracts VIII. by Dr. Porter: Didon's Science without God, Disc. 7. I.*

2. Agnosticism, as set forth by Herbert Spencer, does not deny the existence of God but our knowledge of Him. It is not a mere profession of ignorance but denies the *possibility* of knowledge. This denial is based upon *a priori* considerations drawn from our idea of the infinite.

3. Agnosticism contradicts itself. We cannot argue that God is unknowable because infinite, until we have acquired that very knowledge of the nature of the Infinite which we deny to be possible. Thus Agnosticism is an offensive form of Dogmatism. *Flint, p. 15.*

4. We do not, indeed, comprehend the nature of God perfectly; but, if imperfect comprehension signifies entire ignorance, much of what is called

natural science is a delusion. *Hodge's Syst. Theol. I. pp. 335-365.*

QUESTION 36.

WHAT IS MATERIALISM?—"Materialism is that system which ignores the distinction between matter and mind, and refers all the phenomena of the world, whether physical, vital or mental, to the functions of matter." *Hodge's Syst. Theol. Vol. I. pp. 246-299: Flint's Anti-Th. Theories, Lec. II-IV (historical): Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 145-161: Liddon's Some Elements pp. 43-48: Tulloch's Mod. Theories, pp. 125-168: Didon's Science without God, Disc. II.*

2. Materialism was first systematized by Epicurus (342-271 B. C.), and modern Materialism has not advanced beyond his position. He taught that (a.) *ex nihilo nihil fit,* and the universe is without beginning or end: (b.) space and the number of bodies in it are infinite: (c.) matter is made up of atoms, which are simple, invisible, and indivisible: (d.) these atoms are endowed with forces in addition to gravity: (e.) the amount of matter and force is always the same: (f.) atoms are in perpetual motion, and their combinations form the cosmos: (g.) the soul is material and

mortal, passing into other combinations with the dissolution of the body: (h.) sensation is the only source of knowledge: (i.) nothing is immaterial except a vacuum. *Hodge, pp. 246, 247.*

3. Materialism cannot be true unless the following teachings can be accepted: (a.) that God is corporeal. *S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 3. 1:* (b.) that the soul is mortal. *Strong's Syst. Theol., pp. 555-562:* (c.) that life is fatalistic, a matter of natural and necessary process simply. *Fisher's Grounds, pp. 3-18:* (d.) that there is no moral obligation. Conduct should be ruled by science — e. g. the fittest should survive. Hospitals are a mistake. *Flint, pp. 500-504.*

QUESTION 37.

WHAT IS POSITIVISM?—Positivism is a system formulated by *Auguste Compte* (1798-1857) which asserts that no knowledge is possible which does not come through the external senses, and that nothing is or can be known except phenomena and their laws. The ideas of causality and design cannot be established and Theology is a delusion. *Flint's Anti-The. Theories, Lec. V. espec. pp. 180-190: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 46-48: Tulloch's*

Mod. Theories, pp. 3-88: Didon's Science without God, Disc. I.

2. Positivism is Materialistic, but in being so is inconsistent; for, if our knowledge is confined to phenomena, how is it possible to assert anything as to what underlies phenomena,—that it is material, or spiritual, or *anything at all. Flint, pp. 180, 181.*

3. Furthermore, we are not warranted in calling *all* phenomena material. We have a knowledge of *internal* phenomena, such as thinking, feeling and willing, which is as certain as any portion of our knowledge. Phenomenally speaking—i. e. apparently—these are not material phenomena but spiritual, and to say otherwise is to assert more than mere phenomenalism justifies. *Flint, pp. 181-184.*

4. Positivism leads logically to skepticism. To be consistent it must repudiate, not only all Theistic belief, but also, belief in *any thing* beyond mere appearances. That these appearances have any real or permanent basis, or any other foundation than subjective delusion is impossible for a *consistent Positivist* to assert. But Positivists, like Agnostics,are omniscient concerning things which

their own principles preclude any knowledge of. *Flint, pp. 184-190.*

QUESTION 38.

WHAT IS PANTHEISM?—Pantheism is that system of thought which identifies, or at least confounds, God with the world or totality of being. *Flint's Anti-The. Theories, Lec. IX (historical) and X: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 59-66: Martensen's Dogmatics, §§ 39-43: Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 161-190: Didon's Science without God, Disc. III.*

2. Pantheists agree in the following particulars (a.) there is but one substance, universal and eternal, with many modes: (b) God is immanent in the world but not transcendent. (Some deny all reality to the world—*acosmism*): (c.) God is impersonal, having neither consciousness nor will: (d.) There is no creation, but only an unending and necessary process in eternal substance: (e.) Men are not individual substances, but passing moments in the life of Diety, which will disappear with the dissolution of the body, never to return: (f.) Human acts are Divine and without freedom: (g.) Evil is a form of Divine activity—really good: (h.) Man is the highest mode in the life of Deity.

The Incarnation, when accepted at all, is said to be a *revelation* of this. *Hodge's Syst. Theol. Vol I, pp. 300-309.*

3. Pantheism assumes many deceitful shapes, and contaminates the faith of many Christian thinkers and writers who do not suspect the fact. *Flint, pp. 391, 392: Emergency Tracts No. 9.*

4. The vitality of the system arises from its many-sidedness. It appeals to every type of mind by presenting *as Divine* those elements of the objective and subjective world to which each individual is attracted. But the religious and moral consequences which Pantheism involves are terrible. (a.) By declaring God impersonal it removes the only sufficient basis of worship and dependence upon Divine providence: (b.) By merging all things into God it deifies man: (b.) By denying the reality of evil and of man's accountability to a personal Judge it destroys the only warrant for praising or blaming anybody, and cuts the ground from under common morality.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DIVINE NATURE.

Question 39.

What is our primary notion of God? — Our primary notion of God is of the Infinite Being — i. e. not limited in essence except by what is internal to Himself. *Strong's Syst. Th., pp. 122, 123: Pearson De Deo, VI. 60-64: S.Thos. Sum. Th., I. 7: Hodge's Syst. Th. Vol. I. 380-384: Suarez Sum. Tr. I. lib. II. c. I: Fisher's Grounds of Belief, pp. 38, 39: Perrone Tract De Deo, Vol. II. Pars II. c. III.*

2. The term infinite is negative *(not finite)* and escapes positive definition. But, while indefinable, it is not indefinite. The word represents an idea in our minds which is positive. There is nothing absurd in this. We have a positive idea of sweetness, but we cannot define it because it is unique. There is no basis of comparison. The infinite is also unique, but there is also another reason for our inability to define it. It *transcends*

all things and surpasses our power of comprehension (Psa. CXLV. 3). *Strong, p. 122.*

3. The infinity of God is not *extensive,* as if it were a matter of size or quantity. Size is not a Divine attribute. It is *intensive* and relates to the character and quality of His essence. Hence there is no inconsistency in saying that other beings exist which are not included in His substance. They do not limit His substance for it is spiritual, nor His perfection for it is not dependent. The Infinite is not the all. *Strong, pp. 122, 123.*

4. The Infinite is neither the undetermined nor the unconditioned, but the *self*-determined and the *self*-conditioned. External conditions are unnecessary to Him but not impossible. It is an element in His greatness that He can submit without loss to finite conditions of His own making, if He wills. He has done this by creating and sustaining the world, and by entering into economic and incarnate relations with His creatures. *Strong, pp. 123, 124.*

Question 40.

What is the Incomprehensibility of God? —The incomprehensibility of God signifies that

His nature is too great for man to acquire an *exhaustive* knowledge or understanding of Him or of His ways (Exod. XXXIII. 20: Job XI. 7-9: XXXVI. 26: Psa. CXLV. 3: Eccles. XI. 5: Is. XLV. 15: Mic. IV. 12: John I. 18: Rom. XI. 33, 34: I. Tim. VI. 16: I. John IV. 12). *Hooker's Ec. Pol., I. 2. 2; Pearson De Deo, XIII, pp. 128-136: S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 12; Suarez, Sum. Tract I. lib. 2. c. 5-31.*

2. It should not be supposed, however, that no knowledge of God is possible. We have a *true* and *adequate* knowledge and understanding of God which will be greater, although *not exhaustive,* hereafter. There is a true *theologia viatorum et beatorum. Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib 7: Suarez c. 8-30.*

3. The possibility of revelation depends upon the fact that God is *apprehensible* and at least *partially comprehensible* (John XVII. 3: I. Cor. II. 9, 10: XIII. 12: I. John III. 2.) *Martensen, §45.*

QUESTION 41.

HOW DO WE FORM OUR IDEA OF AN INFINITE GOD? —We form our idea of an infinite God (a.) by way of *negation,* denying all external limitation:

(b.) by way of *eminence,* ascribed to Him the highest degree of every excellence: (c.) by way of *causality,* inferring the character of His attributes from the character of His works. *Hodge's Syst. Theol. I. 339.*

2. Our ideas of God are necessarily *anthropomorphic.* Man was made in the image of God and after His likeness (Gen. I. 26, 27). If man is like God in any respect, in that respect God is like man. There is a true anthropomorphism. False anthropomorphism arises from forgetting that man is not a *complete* image of God, but inferior to him. The higher cannot be adequately interpreted by means of the lower, but the lower is properly interpreted by the higher. *A. Moore's Science and the Faith, pp. 50-53: Hodge's Outlines, pp. 131-133: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 41, 42.*

3. Holy Scripture uses much language about God which is metaphorical (Gen. VI. 6, 7: Exod. XXXIII. 11, 20: Deut. XXIX. 20: II. Sam. XXII. 9, 16: II. Chron. XVI. 9: Psa. XVIII. 9: XCV. 10: Isa. LII. 10: Jer. XV. 6). False anthropomorphism interprets such language literally, and attributes body, parts, and passions to God. To do so is to violate the rule of Biblical interpreta-

tion that one passage should not be so interpreted as to conflict with another. *Pearson De Deo, IV. p. 37.*

QUESTION 42.

WHAT ARE SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT NAMES OF GOD IN HOLY SCRIPTURE?—Some of the most important Names of God in Holy Scripture, are Elohim, Jehovah, Adonai, Father, and the threefold Name. *Hodge's Outlines, pp. 134, 135: Owen's Dog. Theol. ch. 2, § 14: S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 13: Petav. De Dog. T. 1. lib. 8. ch. 6-9: Suarez Sum., Tr. 1, lib. 2. ch. 32:*

2. ELOHIM is a plural noun, used in the first chapter of Genesis and in many other places. It signifies the Mighty One, and is employed where the creative power and omnipotence of God are described or implied. Its plural form may be interpreted as a plural of majesty, but most truly as an adumbration of the plural personality of God. *Liddon's Bamp. Lec., pp. 49-51.*

3. JEHOVAH signifies the self-existence and eternal unchangeableness of God. It is the incommunicable Name, which the Jews never pronounced, but read as if it were Adonai. In the A. V. it is translated LORD, and printed in capitals.

It occurs frequently in conjunction with Elohim, when the phrase is translated Lord God.

4. Adonai signifies Lord, expressing possession and dominion over all. Like Elohim it occurs in the plural.

5. Father signifies the Producer of all things and involves the ideas of authority and providence derived from that relation. God is Father of all things as their Creator, and of men as their personal Governor; but especially of baptized Christians, who have been mystically united with His Only-Begotten, and made His children *par excellence* by adoption and grace. This Name is also specially applied to the First Person of the Blessed Trinity as the unoriginate source of the Godhead. *Pearson on the Creed, pp. 45-50, 52-74, espec. pp. 73, 74.*

6. The most perfect Name of God is that of the Blessed Trinity—The Father, The Son, and the Holy Ghost, which Name is one and singular, though threefold in its articulation. It expresses the internal and personal distinctions in the Godhead, and the eternal relations which are involved in them. *Mason's Faith of the Gospel, ch. 2, § 2.*

7. The Names of God constitute one of five ways by which Holy Scripture reveals God to us. These ways are the following, (a.) by His Names: (b.) by the works which they ascribe to Him: (c.) by the attributes which they predicate of Him: (d.) by the worship of Him which they prescribe: (e.) by the revelation of "the fulness of the Godhead bodily," in Christ. *Hodge's Outlines, p. 134.*

QUESTION 43.

WHAT ARE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES? — Divine attributes are certain true and distinct predicates, which our knowledge of God, however derived, enables us to apply to Him. *Owen's Dog. Th. ch. 4, §2: Pearson De Deo, IV. pp. 37-41: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog. Tr. V. §§61-84.*

2. To discuss the Divine Attributes in detail is to analyze the contents of our knowledge of the Divine nature.

3. The Divine attributes are *true* predicates, and not simply "man's modes of apprehending God." They are "objective determinations in His revelation, and as such are rooted in His inmost essence." *Martensen, §46.*

4. The Divine Attributes express *distinct*

perfections in the Divine essence. They do not indeed differ *in re,* as if the essence of God could be divided, but *in ratione,* which means that the Divine attributes are *logical* distinctions rather than ontological, although necessary and grounded in the eternal and immutable essence of God. *Hodge's Syst. Theol. I. 373, 374: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 38, 39: Pearson, pp. 39, 40.*

5. The Divine attributes are *not adequate* expressions of the Divine nature, but such as can be framed in human language. They are true as far as they go, and are sufficient for the correct guidance of our apprehensions. But they indicate lines of truth, to the end of which our minds are unable to travel. *Mozley on Predestination, pp. 15-21.*

6. The Divine attributes are ascertained in three ways: (a.) by analyzing the idea of infinity and absolute perfection: (b.) by inference from the character of those Divine operations which are observable in the physical and moral world: (c.) by studying the indications given in supernatural revelation. This last method is the only one which secures complete and trustworthy re-

sults, and it must be employed to correct and supplement the results of other methods.

7. There are many ways of dividing and arranging the Divine attributes. *Hodge's Outlines, pp. 137, 138.* We shall consider the nature of God (a) according to His *essence,* as self existent, living, perfect, sole and incommunicable: (b.) according to His *substance,* as spiritual and immense: (c.) according to His *life,* as eternal, immutable, and eternally active: (d.) according to His *action,* as omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, wise, and morally perfect. The first three of these divisions are usually treated under the heading "the Nature of God," the last under the heading "the Attributes of God." This usage is followed here.

QUESTION 44.

WHAT IS THE SELF-EXISTENCE OF GOD?—The self-existence of God is that whereby He is without origin and uncreate. He simply is (Exod. III. 14: John VIII. 58), *cf. Q. 42. 3. Strong's Syst. Theol., pp. 123, 124: Pearson De Deo, V. p. 47: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, I. 9.*

2. God is not self-caused, but uncaused. His

being and mode of subsistence is not the product of His will, but a fact of His essence. By that He is determined since nothing else determines Him and He is not indeterminate. *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 3. 4: Pearson De Deo, IV. pp. 35, 36.*

3. To deny the self-existence of God is to deny that He is supreme, for, if He were not self-existent, His existence would be caused by another, to whom he would be inferior. The cosmological argument for the existence of God is also an argument for His self-existence.

4. God is a LIVING God, for He is the Author of life to His creatures (Deut. V. 26: Josh. III. 10: Gen. II, 7: Acts XVII. 25, 28: Col. III. 3), and since He is self-existent, He has life in Himself (John I. 4: V. 26). *Owen's Dog. Theol., Ch. 4, § 10: Pearson De Deo, XIV. pp. 137-143: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 18.*

QUESTION 45.

WHAT IS THE PERFECTION OF GOD?—The perfection of God signifies that he comprehends within His own essence every excellency in infinite degree. Nothing is lacking *according to the mode* of Divine perfection. *S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 4: Jackson, Vol. V, c. IV: Pearson De Deo,*

VI. pp. 55-60: VII. pp. 67-73. Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 6. ch. 7: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §§ 105,-110.

2. The perfection of God can be argued from His infinity, for He Who is without external limitation must be perfect in Himself.

3. All the perfections of every creature have God for their Author, and are evidences of His perfection. They are not, however, reproductions of Divine perfection, but shadows of it. The perfection of God is not the totality of creaturely perfection, although the cause of it; but is peculiar to Himself and simple. "Not all the excellencies of all (creatures) can so fully represent His nature as an ape's shadow doth a man's body. But · · · · infinite variety best sets forth the admirable excellency of His indivisible unity. · · · · So all plurality be excluded, we express His being and perfection best by leaving them, as they truly are, without all quantity." *Jackson pp. 36, 37: S. Thos. I. 4. 2.*

4. By virtue of His infinite perfection, God is SELF-SUFFICIENT. Nothing is wanting to His essence which is needed for his blessedness. Neither His knowledge, nor his will, nor His

love, depend upon the existence of the creature, but have sufficient scope for their activity in the eternal relations subsisting between the Persons of the Trinity. Creation is an act of the Divine *will,* not the result of necessity. *Strong's Syst. Th., pp. 125, 126.*

5. God is the Summum Bonum, the devout contemplation and enjoyment of which is the true and chief end of man : for, as the infinitely Perfect One, and the source of all good, He comprehends in His own essence all that is needed for our eternal blessedness (Psa. LXXIII. 24-26: John XVII. 22, 24). *Westminster Cat. Q. 1; S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 6. 1, 2: Pearson, pp. 70, 71.*

Question 46.

What is meant by the unity of God?— By the Unity of God is meant (a.) His *numerical* unity, or the fact that He is but one, *unus*: (b.) His *integral* unity, or the fact that He is indivisible: (c.) His *uniqueness,* or the fact that He cannot be classed with any other being in genus or species. He is *unus* et *unicus. S. Thos. Sum. Th. I. 11: Jackson, Vol. V. pp. 24, 25: Mason I. 10: Kingdon's God Incarnate, p. 7: Strong's Syst. Theol. p. 125: Owen's Dog. Theol. ch. 4. §6:*

Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 25-38: Pearson De Deo, XI. pp. 109-117.

2. The *integral* unity of God does not signify the absence of real distinctions in His nature, but the absence of divisions simply. His tri-personal subsistence is not inconsistent with this. *Mason I. 10: Strong:*

3. That the Lord our God is *One* Lord is asserted or implied in every part of Holy Scripture, which also bears frequent witness against polytheism or idolatry (Exod. XX. 3: Deut. IV. 35: VI. 4: I. Kings XVIII. 27: Isa. XLIV. 6, 8 *et seq:* XLV. 22: John XVII. 3: Rom. III. 29, 30: I. Cor. VIII. 4-6: I. Tim. I. 17: II. 5). It is also argued (a.) from His simplicity. The individuality and the essence of God are identical, but that which constitutes the individuality of a being can be but one: (b.) from the infinity of His perfection and His supremacy. There can be but one most perfect and supreme: (c.) from the teleological unity of the world. *S. Thos. I. 11. 3: Owen: Mason: Pearson, pp. 114, 115.*

4. No other being can be comprehended in the same category with God. This fact does not preclude the existence of other *beings,* but of

other *Divine* beings. Moreover all other beings are dependent upon, and owe their existence to, the One, with Whom nothing can be co-ordinated (Exod. IX. 14 : Deut. XXXIII. 26 : II. Sam. VII. 22 : Isa. XL. 18-25: XLVI. 5, 9: Jer. X. 6: Matt. XIX. 17). *Dorner's Christian Doc., I. 230-234: Jackson.*

Question 47.

What is the Simplicity of God ?—The Simplicity of God signifies (a.) His spiritual essence (John IV. 24): (b.) that He is pure form: (c.) the identity of His essence and attributes with Himself. *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 3: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 40, 41: Owen's Dog. Th., Ch. 4. §4: Pearson De Deo, V. pp. 43-53: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 2, c. 1, 2: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §§96-104: Perrone Prael. de Deo, Vol. 2 Pars. 2. ch. 1.*

2. That God is incorporeal, and therefore without parts or extension is argued because (a.) He is the Prime Mover of all things; but bodies, in themselves are inert: (b.) He is the most eminent of beings; but the eminence of bodies is entirely due to the life which is in them. This life is not corporeal. *S. Thos. I. 3. 1: Mason I. 8: Pearson, pp. 47-51: Schouppe, § 101.*

3. The spirituality of the Divine essence signifies more than the absence of corporeity. It means, positively, that attribute by virtue of which, God is a living God. Because the Spirit is life, it can assume that which is not spirit into hypostatic union with itself. The Incarnation was such an event (Q. 44. 4).

4. By form, *forma,* is meant the actuality of a thing; by matter, *materia,* its potential principle. God is pure form; actual but not potential. He is, and always has been, in essence what He can be. There is no foundation (prior) for what He is. The distinction between power and energy, δύναμις καὶ ἐνεργεῖα, is misleading in connection with God. He is absolute energy, *purus actus. S. Thos., I. 3. 2: Pearson, p. 46: Schouppe, §103.*

5. The attributes of God, as we have seen (Q. 43. 3, 4), do not differ from each other *in re,* but *in ratione,* although they are true distinctions rooted in his inmost essence. His goodness is a distinct reality, as is also His immutability: but the two are one, ontologically speaking, and inseparable. Furthermore, God is not merely good, but more exactly, He is goodness and the

source of it. When we speak of the Divine Nature, we speak of the Divine Being (I. John IV. 7, 8: I. Cor. I. 24). *S. Thos., I. 3. 3, 4, 6, 7: Jackson, pp. 38-42: Pearson, p. 52.*

Question 48.

What is the Immensity of God?—The Immensity of God is that Divine attribute, of which spatial relations are the finite shadow; or, Divine infinity as contemplated from the point of view of space (Jerem. XXIII. 23). *Athan. Symb: Jackson, V. 42-59: Strong's Syst. Theol., p. 131: Schouppe El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. 118-121: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 50, 51: Pearson De Deo, VIII. pp. 78-86: Suarez Sum., Tr. 1. lib. 2. c 2.*

2. By virtue of His immensity, God is essentially present in all substances (Q. 52. 4-6), but is not comprehended in created things. He is thus both *immanent* and *transcendent* (Deut. IV. 39: cf. w. I. Kings VIII. 27). S. Gregory (in Psa. 139) says, "Deus est intra omnia, non inclusus; extra omnia, non exclusus; supra omnia, non elatus." To which may be added, "infra omnia, non depressus." *A. Moore's, Science and the Faith, p. XLIII.*

3. Space is a relation of created substances

which came into existence with them. The relations between God and space are therefore voluntary to Him, springing from His act of creation.

QUESTION 49.

WHAT IS THE ETERNITY OF GOD?—The Eternity of God is that Divine attribute of which temporal relations are the finite shadow; or, Divine infinity as contemplated from the point of view of time (Exod. III. 14: Deut. XXXIII. 27: Psa. XC. 2-4: XCIII. 2: Isa. XLVIII. 12: LVII. 15: Lam. V..19: Mic. V. 2: Rom. I. 20: Ephes. III. 11: I. Tim. I. 17: VI. 16: II. Pet. III. 8: Rev. I. 8: XXII. 13). *Jackson, V. 60-78: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 10: S. Aug. Conf., XI. 10-31: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. 112-116: Mason I. 11: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 51, 52: Owen's Dog. Th. ch. 4. §8: Pearson De Deo. X. pp. 96-108: Petav. De Dog., T.1.lib.3.c.3-6: Suarez, Tr. 1, lib. 2. ch. 4.*

2. The word Eternal has three uses: (a.) with beginning but without end—life eternal of the saints: (b.) without beginning or end but unnecessary—the creative act of God: (c.) without beginning or end and necessary. The last is

peculiar to the life of God, and is not possible elsewhere, even for the saints. *Schouppe, 112.*

3. Time is a relation of created things and of finite events. When of things, it expresses their duration; when of events, it is the measure of their succession. But Divine eternity is an idea which transcends duration and excludes all but logical succession. Boethius and the Scholastics describe it as "Interminibilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio." *S. Thos. I. 10.1: Hooker's Ec. Pol., V. 69. 1, 2.*

4. Time and eternity have been illustrated by the circumference of a circle and its center. The center *corresponds* to every division and motion of the circumference, without being divisible or movable itself. There is a succession of parts in circumference, but none in the center. The circumference may be indefinitely expanded, yet the center will correspond to a larger circle still. Yet eternity is neither an extension nor a modification of time. Time is *nunc volans,* eternity *nunc stans. Strong's Syst. Th., p. 131: Schouppe, §114.*

5. The Eternal One has no involuntary relations to time, but freely enters into temporal re-

lations by virtue of creation. He is therefore said to *fore*-know and to *pre*-destinate.

6. God is IMMUTABLE—free from the vicissitudes of change, although He enters into *relations with* mutability. This latter truth justifies the metaphorical allusions in Holy Scripture to Divine providence, and the delay of the Incarnation until the fulness of time (Num. XXIII. 19: I. Sam. XV. 29: Psa. XXXIII. 11: Eccles. III. 14: Mal. III. 6: Heb. I. 12: VI. 17: XIII. 8: Jas. I. 17). *Nicene Anathema: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 47,48: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §§124-131: Martensen's Dog., §48: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 4. §7: Pearson De Deo, IX. pp. 87-95: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 9: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 3. c. 1,2: Strong's Syst. Th. pp. 124,125.*

7. God is described in Holy Scripture as alone IMMORTAL (Deut. XXXII. 40: I. Tim. VI. 16.: Rev. IV. 9). By this is meant that He is not subject, in His essence, either to development or corruption. The saints are subject to both in this life, and to development in the world to come (I. Cor. XV. 36: II. Cor. III. 18: Heb. IX. 27). Their immortality is also derived, while that of God is underived (Q. 44.4). *Martensen, §48.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

Question 50.

What is the Omnipotence of God? — The Omnipotence of God signifies (a.) His infinite energy and freedom to do all that is consistent with His nature: (b.) His sovereignty over all that is or can be done. (Gen. XVII. 1: XVIII. 14: Psa. CXV. 3: CXXXV. 6: Jer. XXXII. 17: Matt. XIX. 26: Mark X. 27: Luke I. 37: Ephes. I. 11, 19-22: III. 20: Heb. I. 3: Rev. XV. 3). *Pearson on the Creed, pp. 75-83: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 25: Schouppe El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §§ 161-165: Mason, I. 12: Forbes' Nic-Creed, pp. 48, 49, 91-93: Martensen's Dog., §49; Hodge's Syst. Th., I. 406-413: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 5. c. 5-11.*

2. God is not tied to the use of means, nor to any particular use of them, by any principle which is external to Himself (Matt. III. 9). He cannot, however, do anything (a.) which is in-

consistent with His own holiness (II. Tim. II. 13: Heb. VI. 18): (b.) which would involve a change in His own nature or purposes: (c.) which would be self-contradictory and absurd; e. g. to make a fact not a fact, or to draw a shorter line between two points than a straight one.

3. By virtue of His sovereignty, all creaturely actions, even when free, are done by His permission and with power supplied by Him. Evil actions, though designed to thwart His will, are overruled by Him to the accomplishment of it.

4. The exercise of Divine energy is twofold: (a.) *internal* action of generation and spiration, which is necessary: (b.) *external* action, which is voluntary and concerned with originating, preserving, energizing, and developing, and governing created things. *Schouppe, El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §134.*

5. Both of these actions are eternal and immutable, but the latter has temporal and mutable relations and aspects, owing to the finite nature which has been imposed upon its results. Thus the action of God is often described in Holy Scripture as if temporal—not in its nature, but in its creatureward relations (Q. 51. 4).

Question 51.

In what ways is the Will of God distinguished?—The will of God is distinguished as (a.) the will of *good pleasure:* (b.) the will of the *signs.* The will of good pleasure is still further distinguished as (a.) *antecedent* and *consequent:* (b.) *absolute* and *conditional. Schouppe, El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. 155-160: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 19: Forbes' Nic. Creed, p. 47, 56-61: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 4. §13: Pearson De Deo, XX, XXI. pp. 206-231: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 5. c. 1-4: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 56,57, 184-190.*

2. The will of God, strictly speaking, is simplex and without real distinction. But, as contemplated from a temporal point of view, it appears multiplex.

3. The will of *good pleasure,* also called *intrinsic,* is the volition itself whereby God wills any thing or does not will it (Psa. CXV. 3). The will of the *signs,* also called *extrinsic,* and *metaphorical,* is not, strictly speaking, the will of God at all, but its external declaration to us (Matt. VII. 21).

4. By His *antecedent* will God wills any thing

secundum se, without reference to particular circumstances; e. g. the salvation of all men (II. Tim. II. 4). By His *consequent* will God wills a thing in view of circumstances foreseen ; e. g. the everlasting punishment of obstinate sinners (Rom. IX. 22). Strictly speaking, there can be no temporal development or modification of God's will of good pleasure. But, since His will is accomplished *in time,* it exhibits to us the relations of antecedence and consequence.

5. The *absolute* will of God depends upon no external conditions. Thus, He willed to create. His *conditional* will depends upon some action on the part of His free creatures. Thus He wills the future glory of those whom He has called in Christ, if they make their calling and election sure. The relation between the will of God and the will of man, is mysterious. The former is eternal and irreversible, the latter real and free, within its proper limits. The appearance of contradiction in this, arises from the finiteness of our understandings, and the necessity of contemplating the infinite and immutable from a finite and mutable point of view (Q. 53.4). This bears upon Divine Predestination, which will be

discussed in connection with the doctrine of grace.

6. The will of the *signs* is divided into five parts: (a.) commandment: (b.) prohibition: (c.) permission: (d.) counsel: (e.) operation and example. The latter includes the natural and supernatural orders, so far as we know them, and the life of Christ.

Question 52.

What is the Omniscience of God?—The Omniscience of God is His infinite knowledge of all things which can be objects of knowledge (Psa. XXXIII. 13, 14: CXXXIX. 1-16: CXLVII. 4, 5: Isa. XLVI. 9, 10: Matt. VI. 8: X. 29, 30: Acts II. 23: XV. 18: Rom. XI. 33: Heb. IV. 12, 13). *Strong's Syst. Theol., p. 133: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 52-56: Owen's Dog. Theol., ch. 4. §11: Pearson De Deo, XV-XIX., pp. 149-205: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 14: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 4: Schouppe, Tr. V. §§136-154: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, I. 11.*

2. Divine knowledge is (a.) *intuitive,* without mental process: (b.) *immediate,* independent of external media: (c.) *eternal,* without temporal

limitation: (d.) *actual*, not a mere power of knowing: (e.) *universal*, including all things in its range, real or possible, internal or external to Himself, general or particular: (f.) *perfect*, without possibility of development or forgetfulness.

3. God knows all things, past, present, and future, *as such*, for He has created and entered into real relations with the temporal. But His knowledge of them all is *simultaneous*. He foreknows, but there is *no temporal interval* between His act of knowing and the event known.

4. God also knows things *everywhere*, and their spatial relations, but there is *no spatial separation* between Himself and what He knows. The OMNIPRESENCE of God is deduced from (a.) His omniscience (Psa. CXIII. 5, 6): (b.) His immensity (Jer. XXIII. 23, 24): (c.) His operations (Psa. CXXXIX. 7-13). *Forbes' Nic. Creed, p. 51: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 4. §9: Pearson De Deo, VIII. pp. 76-86: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 8: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 3. c. 7-10: Strong's Syst. Th., p. 132.*

5. The Divine omnipresence is (a) *free*, for the created things which it presupposes came into existence by the will of God: (b.) *actual* and not

potential merely: (c.) *penetrative,* but not diffusive or expansive: (d.) *indivisible* and entire in every thing.

> "Though God extends beyond creation's rim,
> Each smallest atom holds the whole of Him."

6. If God were omnipresent *simply,* communion with Him would be impossible. But He has revealed to us special and limited modes of presence, according to which He wills to be present to His creatures. He is present (a.) *in glory,* to the adoring hosts of heaven (Isa. VI. 1-3: Rev. VII. 9-12): (b.) *with efficiency,* in the natural order (Nah. I. 3-5): (c.) *providentially,* in the affairs of men (Psa. LXVIII. 7, 8): (d.) *attentively,* to those who seek him (Matt. XVIII. 19, 20: Acts XVII. 27): (e.) *judicially,* to the consciences of the wicked (Gen. III. 8: Psa. LXVIII. 1, 2): (f.) *bodily,* in the Incarnate Son: (Col. II. 9): (g.) *mystically,* in the Church of Christ (Ephes. II. 12-22): (h.) *officially,* with His Ministers (Matt. XXVIII. 19, 20): (i.) *sacramentally* and *adorably,* in the Holy Eucharist (John VI. 56: Luke XXII. 19, 20). *Martensen's Dog., §48.*

QUESTION 53.

WHAT IS THE WISDOM OF GOD?—The Wisdom of God is His absolute infallibility of judgment, by virtue of which He provides perfectly for all things and cannot err in any question of action, whether that action springs from Himself or the creature, and whether it is past, present, or future (Psa. CIV. 24: Prov. VIII. 11-31: I. Cor. I. 18-30: I. Ephes. III. 10: Jas. I. 5). *Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §§ 167-170: Martensen's Dog., §50.*

2. The wisdom of God combines His omnipotence and omniscience. It is His teleological knowledge, whereby He designs all things, and over rules the course of events to the furtherance of His own ends. This action is called the PROVIDENCE of God (Gen. XX. 6: L. 20: Exod. XII. 36: II. Sam. XVI. 10: XXIV. 1: Job XXXVII: Psa. XXXIII. 12-22: CIV: CXXXV. 5-7: Prov. XVI. 1: XIX. 21: Jer. X. 23: Matt. VI. 25-32: X. 30: Rom. XI. 32-36: Ephes. II. 10: Phil. II. 13). *Martensen, §50: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 22: Schouppe, El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. 195-201: Strong's Syst. Theol., pp. 207-220: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 61-63: Hooker's Ec. Pol., I. 3. 4:*

Pearson De Deo, XXII. 232-242: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 8. c. 1-5.

3. The providence of God is distinguished as *general* and *particular,* the former having to do with the teleological government of the universe as a whole, the latter with provisions for its minutest details—e. g. the exigencies arising from the free actions of men. *Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 192-194.*

4. The relations between Divine sovereignty and creaturely freedom, as has been said (Q. 51.5), are inscrutable ; but we know that God and man *co-operate* in every human action, whether good or evil, in such wise that the integrity of each is preserved and the holiness of God uncontaminated. God supplies the power in evil conduct, but is not so much its Author as its over ruling cause. *Strong's Syst. Th., pp. 209, 210: 219, 220.*

5. The prayers of men are real moral forces, *fore*-seen and *for*-seen by God from the beginning, and used as His instruments in accomplishing His designs. If the contents of a prayer are inconsistent with His will, it is none the less a genuine moral force, but it will be over ruled to sub-

serve Divine ends. *Strong, pp. 215-218: Liddon's Some Elements, pp. 184-190.*

6. The wisdom of God is displayed, not only in His ordinary providence, but, pre-eminently, in the Redemption of men from sin, and in the judgment of those who neglect His grace.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES.

Question 54.

What is the Moral Perfection of God?—The Moral Perfection of God signifies (a.) the absolute *integrity* of each and every moral attribute in all Divine action: (b.) the infinite *intensity* of each attribute.

2. No Divine attribute may be emphasized at the expense of another. For example, God is infinitely merciful and infinitely just in all His actions. His mercy may be *most apparent,* in His forgiveness of sinners, and His justice in the reprobation of the obstinate; but we may not suppose that justice is waived or curtailed in the one case, nor mercy shortened in the other. *S. Thos., I. 21. 4.*

3. The Divine character is as inscrutable as His essence. It is therefore impossible for us to discover or explain the harmony which

lies behind the various, and apparently opposing, manifestations of His moral attributes (Q. 40).

QUESTION 55.

WHAT IS THE GOODNESS OF GOD? — The Goodness of God is that attribute by virtue of which God is *communicative* of what is desirable (Psa. LXV. 4: CXLV. 7-16: Neh. IX. 35: Jer. XXXI. 12, 14: Zech. IX. 17: Matt. V. 45). *Martensen's Dog., §50: Strong's Syst. Th., p. 138 (b.): Hodge's Syst. Th., I. 427-436: Pearson De Deo, VII. pp. 73, 74: Martensen's Dog., §§50, 51: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §§173, 177, 179-194.*

2. By virtue of His perfection, God comprehends in Himself everything which is desirable, and is the source of all good to others.

3. *Ad intra,* the goodness of the Father moved Him to beget His Beloved Son, to Whom He eternally communicates His Own self-existent essence. By virtue of the same attribute, the Father and the Son eternally communicate their common essence to the Holy Ghost; and all the Blessed Three eternally communicate of their richness to each other. This communication per-

tains to the Divine essence and is both eternal and necessary.

4. *Ad extra,* the goodness of God moves Him to create and communicate being and life to finite things, external to His Own essence, in order that He may impart to them such good gifts as they can receive. This communication is voluntary, and is determined as to its results by finite conditions imposed by the Creator Himself. The creatures are made *indigentia Dei,* and satisfaction of the need is made possible. *Pearson, p. 74: Martensen, §50.*

5. The goodness of God *ad extra* includes His Benevolence, by which is meant "the constant will of God to communicate felicity to His creatures, according to their conditions and His Own wisdom." (Nah. I. 7: Psa. CXLV. 9). *Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. §173.*

6. Because of His benevolence, God has determined, by His will of good pleasure, to alleviate the miseries of this life which have been caused by the sins of the creature, and to employ such means for the Salvation of mankind as are consistent with His Own holiness and creaturely responsibility. *Schouppe's, El. Th., Dog., Tr. V. §§177-194.*

QUESTION 56.

WHAT IS THE LOVE OF GOD?—The Love of God is that appetitive, but passionless and changeless movement of His essence whereby He desires to gather into union with Himself all who are good. *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 20: Martensen's Dog., §51: Strong's Syst. Theol., pp. 127, 137: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, I.14.*

2. Love pre-supposes a personal subject loving, and discharges itself towards a personal object. *Martensen. Ad intra,* these conditions are satisfied within the Divine essence. The Father loves His Son, and is loved by the Son, and the Holy Ghost is the bond of Divine love. Love is in fact the moral expression of the Divine unity, and is the focus of all Divine attributes. God is Love (I. John IV. 16: John XVII. 26: Ephes. II. 4, 7).

3. *Ad extra,* the goodness of God moved Him to create objects on whom He might pour forth His love. He loves all His creatures because the nature which he has imparted to them is good. But so far as they depart from righteousness and corrupt their natures, He hates them (Mal. I. 3:

Rom. IX. 13). Thus He loves sinners as creatures, but hates them as sinners (Deut. VII. 7, 8: X. 15: Job. VII. 17: Isa. XLIX. 15, 16: LIV. 10: Jer. XXXI. 3: Hos. XI. 1, 4: Zeph. III. 17: Mal. I. 1: John III. 16: Rom. VIII. 35, 38, 39: Ephes. I. 4: III. 19: II. Thess. II. 16: I. John III. 1, 16: IV. 7 et seq.). *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 20. 2 ad quart.*

4. The Mercy of God is that characteristic of his love which moves Him to plan the salvation of sinners, that they may become worthy of union with Himself. If they take advantage of His salvation, He ceases to hate them and unites them to Himself in everlasting love. To save them, He goes so far as to give His Beloved Son to die for them (Gen. XIX. 16: Exod. XX. 6: XXXIV. 6, 7: Num. XIV. 18: Deut. IV. 31: Judges II. 18: X. 15, 16: I. Chron. XV. 34: II. Chron. XXX. 9: Neh. IX. 17, 31: Psa. XXV. 7-10: CIII. 2-17: CXXXVI. 1-26: Isa. XXX. 18: LXIII. 9: Jer. III. 12: Lam. III. 22, 23: Dan. VI. 9: Joel. II. 13: Luke I. 50: John III. 16: Rom. V. 8: Ephes. II. 4, 7: Jas. V. 11: II. Pet. III. 9, 15). *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 21. 3, 4: Strong's Syst. Theol., p. 137: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., §§207, 209.*

5. The dispensation of God's mercy is embodied in a kingdom of GRACE, wherein every help and sanctifying instrument which the wisdom of God has devised, is gathered and administered. But the grace of God is not confined to the Church. It is imparted to all men in various measures, under different conditions, and with various possibilities.

QUESTION 57.

WHAT IS THE HOLINESS OF GOD?—The Holiness of God is His self affirming purity; the attribute which guards the distinction between God and the creature. It is the ground of reverence and adoration (Exod. III. 5: XV. 11: XIX. 10-16: Isa. VI. 3, 5-7: Psa. XCIX. 9: II. Cor. VII. 1: I. Thess. III. 13: IV. 7: Heb. XII. 29). *Martensen's Dog., §51: Strong's Syst. Th., pp. 128-130: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. 174-176: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, I. 13.*

2. The Holiness of God involves (a.) freedom and separation from moral evil: (b.) positive moral perfection. God is the source of holiness to His creatures, and can only be seen or approached by the holy. *Schouppe: Pearson De Deo, VII. p. 73: Petav. De Dog., T. 1. lib. 6. c. 6.*

3. The Righteousness of God is His relative Holiness, by virtue of which, His treatment of the creature conforms to the purity of His nature. It is legislative Holiness, or the revelation of Divine Holiness in the form of moral requirement (Matt. V. 48: I. Pet. I. 16). *Strong's Syst. Th., pp. 138-140.*

4. The Truth of God involves that all His manifestations, whether natural or supernatural, should be consistent with Himself and each other. Earlier and more rudimentary indications are not contradicted, but are illuminated, by later and fuller knowledge (Isa. XL. 8: Matt. V. 18: John III. 33: XIV. 6, 17: Rom. I. 25: III. 4: I. John V. 6). *Strong, p. 137: Schouppe, Tr. V. 202-205.*

5. The Faithfulness of God secures the fulfilment of His promises, which are based, not upon what we are or have done, but upon what Christ is and has done. Our sins do not invalidate them so long as we fulfil the conditions of repentance and good works (Num. XXIII. 19: I. Cor. I. 9: II. Cor. I. 20: I. Thess. V. 24: Tit. I. 2: Heb. VI. 18: I. Pet. IV. 19). *Strong, p. 137.*

QUESTION 58.

WHAT IS THE JUSTICE OF GOD?—The Justice of God is "His constant and efficacious will of dispensing rewards and punishments to creatures according to the merits of each" (Gen. XVIII. 25: Psa. VII. 9-11: XVIII. 24: LXXXIX. 14: CXIX. 37: Jer. XXIII. 5: Rom. II. 2-11: I. Pet. I. 17: Jas. II. 12 et seq: Rev. XIX. 11: XX. 13). *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 21. 1, 2, 4: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. V. 208, 210.*

2. The Justice of God is the counterpart of His righteousness, and is sometimes identified with it (Rom. III. 26); Justice being the foundation of Divine Law, righteousness the basis of Divine judgment passed upon failure to fulfil the law (Heb. X. 30, 31). *Strong's Syst. Th., p. 138.*

3. The merits of the creature do not, in the first instance, arise from his own efforts, but from the meritorious passion of Christ. But the blood of Christ is the seal of an everlasting covenant, by virtue of which the members of Christ are enabled to do the will of God and *deserve* His favor (Rom. IV. 25: Heb. XIII. 20, 21). "God rewards Christ's work for us and *in* us"—not, in the first instance, *on account of* man's works, but,

none the less, *according to* them (cf. Luke XVII. 7-10, w. Acts X. 34, 25: and II. John 8: Tit. III. 4-7, w. Rom. II. 6).

4. The judgments of God are without respect of persons, being simply the expression of His righteousness in the presence of moral evil;—not vindictive, but vindicative (Rom. II. 11). *Strong, p. 139 (e).*

Question 59.

What is the Blessedness of God?—The Blessedness of God is the richness and joy of His life, arising from the internal relations of the Divine Persons, and also from the relations subsisting between God and His saints (Psa. CXLVII. 11: CXLIX. 4: Prov. XV. 8: Isa. LXII. 5: John XVII. 5). *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 26: Martensen's Dog., §51.*

2. The Blessedness of God is the reflection of Divine love, both within the Trinity and in the Kingdom of God. The latter is conditioned; arising from the creative activity of God, and His condescension revealed in the Incarnation and the descent of the Holy Ghost.

3. The pity and grief and anger of God, caused by the sins of men, do not interfere with His Blessedness; for, where sin abounds, His grace abounds much more and renders the Divine dispensation of love fruitful in glory (Luke XV. 7, 10, 22-24: Rom. V. 20, 21).

4. The response of man to the grace of God finds articulate expression in the worship of the faithful; their Eucharistic Oblations here, and the heavenly worship hereafter, which those Oblations anticipate (Rev. VII. 9-17).

CHAPTER X.

THE TRINITY.

Question 60.

What is the doctrine of the Trinity? — The doctrine of the Trinity, as stated in our articles, is, that, *There is but one living and true God. . . . . : And in the unity of this Godhead there be Three Persons, of one substance, power, and eternity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.* See *Forbes' 39 Arts., I: Nic. Creed, pp. 70-87: Browne's 39 Arts., I: Newman's Arians, c. II. §2-4: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI: Petav. De Dogmatibus, Tom. 2 et seq: Liddon's Bamp. Lec. I. §I: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 27-43: Kingdon's God Incarnate, pp. 11-16: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, c. 2: Waterland's Works, 1st 3 vols: Hooker's Ec. Pol., I. 2. 2: V. 51. 1: Richey's Truth and Counter Truth, ch. 1: S. Augustine on the Trinity.*

2. The Athanasian Creed says, that *we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity;*

neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost; but the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost. The Father · · · the Son · · · the Holy Ghost Incarnate · · · incomprehensible · · · eternal · · · almighty · · · God · · · Lord, and yet not three Lords but one Lord. For, like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord, so are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say there be three Gods, or three Lords. The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity none is afore or after other, none is greater or less than another; but the whole Three Persons are co-eternal together and co-equal. So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.

3. This doctrine is involved in the Baptismal formula, and has been held in its integrity by the Church from the beginning. But its fuller analysis and statement was the fruit of centuries of conflict with error. The history of this conflict can be studied in *Browne's 39 Arts., pp. 21-34: Newman's Arians: Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith: Petavius, De Dogmatibus Tom. II. Pref. et lib. I.*

4. Four truths are involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, (a.) the Unity of essence (Q. 46): (b.) the threefold Subsistence (Q. 64-66): (c.) the Circumcession (Q. 67): (d.) the Divine Monarchy (Q. 68). *Newman's Tracts Theol. and Eccl., pp. 160, 161.*

Question 61.

What Biblical proof can be alleged for the doctrine of the Trinity?—Many adumbrations of this doctrine are contained in the Old Testament, and the New Testament reveals distinctly the Divinity of the Three and Their Unity. *Jones of Nay. on the Cath. Doc. of the Trinity.*

OLD TESTAMENT ADUMBRATIONS.

2. The Divine Name, Elohim, occurs many times in the plural number (e. g. Gen. I. 1)—With plural adjectives (Deut. IV. 7: Josh. XXIV. 19)—With plural pronouns (Gen. I. 26: XI. 6, 7: Isa. VI. 8: espec. Gen. III. 2)—With plural verbs (Gen. XX. 13: XXXV. 7).

3. Other names of God appear in the plural (Psa. LXXVIII. 25: Prov. IX. 10: Eccles. V. 8: XII. 1: Isa. LIV. 5: Dan. IV. 17, 26: V. 18, 20: Mal. I. 6).

4. God is spoken of, and speaks of Himself, as more than one Person (Gen. XIX. 24: Psa. CX. 1: Prov. XXX. 4: Isa. X. 12: XIII. 13: XXII. 19: LXIV. 4: Dan. IX. 17: Hos. I. 7: Zech. II. 10, 11: X. 12).

5. Three Divine Persons seem to be implied (Num. VI. 24-26: Psa. XXXIII. 6: Isa. VI. 3. XXXIV. 16).

NEW TESTAMENT PASSAGES.

6. Matt. III. 16, 17: XXVIII. 19: John XIV. 16, 17, 26: XV. 26: II. Cor. XIII. 14: Gal. IV. 6: II. Thess. III. 5: [I. John V. 7].

THESE THREE ARE ONE.

7. Each is the Creator, yet there is but One Creator (cf. Psa. XXXIII. 6 w. Isa. XLIV. 24) —Each is Jehovah (Deut. VI. 4: Jer. XXIII. 6: Ezek. VIII. 1, 3)—the Lord (Rom. X. 12: Luke II. 11: II. Cor. III. 18)—the God of Israel (Matt. XV. 31: Luke I. 16, 17: II. Sam. XXIII. 2, 3)—the Law-giver (Rom. VII. 25: Gal. VI. 2: Rom. VIII. 2: Jas. IV. 12)—omnipresent (Jer. XXIII. 24: Ephes. I. 22: Psa. CXXXIX. 7, 8)—the Source of life (Deut. XXX. 20: Col. III. 4: Rom. VIII. 10)—made mankind (Psa. C. 3: John I. 3: Job. XXXIII. 4)—quickens the dead (John V. 21: ibid: VI. 33)—raised Christ (I. Cor. VI. 14: John II. 19: I. Pet. III. 18)—commissions the Ministry (II. Cor. III. 5, 6: I. Tim. I. 12: Acts V. 28)—sanctifies the elect (Jude 1: Heb. II. 11: Rom. XV. 16)—performs *all* spiritual operations (I. Cor. XII. 16: Col. III. 11: I. Cor. XII. 11).

8. The Biblical proof of the Divinity of Christ and of the Holy Ghost will be given when we come to Christology and Pneumatology.

Question 62.

What are the most important technical terms employed in connection with the doc-

TRINE OF THE TRINITY?—The most important technical terms employed in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, are essence, nature, substance, existence, subsistence, suppositum, person, procession, notion, relation, and property. *Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 20, 21: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. 6-47.*

2. *Essence* (essentia, *ουσία*) is that which constitutes a thing what it is. It is expressed by the definition of a thing.

3. *Nature* (natura, *Φύσις*) is (a.) that which has its origin from another: (b.) the same as essence, but with an interior principle of *action,* i. e., the first principle and subject of all activity in a being.

4. *Substance* (substantia) is (a.) the same as essence: (b.) that which underlies accidents: (c.) that which exists per se, and needs no subject in which to inhere.

5. *Existence* (existentia) is essence in actuality as distinguished from potentiality.

6. *Subsistence* (subsistentia) is that by which a single substance or substantial nature is constituted with its proper and independent mode of existence.

7. *Suppositum* is concrete subsistence, or a substantial nature constituted with a con-natural mode of existence. Any man, e. g. Peter, is a suppositum; but the human soul by itself is not. Nor is the humanity of Christ, since its subsistence is not con-natural; but it pertains to the suppositum of the Word Incarnate.

8. *Person* (persona, ὑπόστασις) is a *rational* suppositum, being related to suppositum as species to genus: or, as defined by Boethius, *Persona est animae rationalis individua substantia:* or, according to Porter, "distinct subsistence, either actually or latently self-conscious and self determining." *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 29: Liddon's Bamp. Lec. p. 33, note d: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 5. §5.*

9. *Procession* (processio) is the origin of one from another.

10. *Notion* (notio) is that by which we can distinguish one person from another.

11. *Relation* (relatio) is the order or status of one towards another.

12. *Property* (proprietas) is the peculiar characteristic of a person.

QUESTION 63.

OF WHAT NATURE IS THE DIVINE SUBSISTENCE? —The Divine subsistence is personal, inasmuch as God is a Being Who is self-conscious, intelligent and free. *Strong's Syst. Th., pp. 56, 57, 121, 122, 160: Mulford's Rep. of God, pp. 23-26: Liddon's Some Elements, p. 35.*

2. We infer that God is personal because (a.) such a world as ours could not be caused by any other than an intelligent being: (b.) the existence of finite persons requires that their First Cause should be personal: (c.) the sense of responsibility to the Supreme Being, and the religious instinct are otherwise meaningless: (d.) we cannot conceive of a being who is impersonal unless he is also inferior to ourselves. The supremacy and personality of God stand or fall together: (e.) the theory that God is impersonal involves all the moral difficulties of Pantheism (Q. 38. 4). *Christlieb's Mod. Doubt, pp. 161-190.*

3. The Pantheist objects, however, that an infinite being cannot be personal, for such a being cannot be self-conscious except by distinguishing ego from non-ego—i. e. His self-consciousness is conditioned by something external

to Himself. In reply, it is to be said that (a.) we cannot argue from what is necessary for finite self-consciousness, to what is necessary for infinite self-consciousness: (b.) if Divine self-consciousness is thus conditioned, the condition is satisfied within the Godhead, by virtue of the personal distinctions existing eternally within the Divine essence. *Mulford: Strong, pp. 56, 57.*

Question 64.

How do we know that there are three Persons in the Godhead?—We know there are three Persons in the Godhead through revelation only. But the contents of revelation in this matter can be shown to be in harmony with reason. *Martensen's Dog., §§54, 55.*

2. Finite personality is conditioned by contra-position of ego and non-ego. This does not prove the *necessity* of such a contra-position in the Divine, but suggests the *likelihood* of it. Thus (a.) self-consciousness is attended by the distinction between ego and non-ego: (b.) love implies an object of love: (c.) all action implies the distinction between state and relation. Such conditions are not satisfied by creaturehood, for the Eternal requires an *eternal* contra-position,

and God is not dependent upon the creature for self-determination. *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 30: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. §§82-88: Martensen's Dog., §55.*

3. Reason, however, can neither discover the actual number of Persons subsisting in the Godhead nor demonstrate that number after it has been revealed. Yet attempts have been made to construct a rationale of the Trinity which have a basis of truth, although they are more suggestive than final.

4. There must be a principle of origin in the Godhead, in which all that is Divine inheres, and this principle is the Father, Who is called the unoriginate source of the Godhead. But the Father *contemplates,* and requires an infinite object of contemplation reflective of Himself. His thought conceives that object, His Personal Word, in Whom He beholds His own Image. But there can be no schism or dualism in the Godhead. *Love unites* the Father and the Son, and the bond of love is a Person, the Holy Ghost, Who receives the essence of Both by proceeding from Both. *Kingdon's God Incarnate, pp. 11-14: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 122-124: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, II. 6: Martensen's Dog., §56.*

5. There is no logical contradiction between the phrases "One Divine Essence," and "Three Divine Persons," for essence and person are not synonymous terms. *Richey's Truth and Counter Truth, p. 13.* Furthermore, a *distinction* of Persons in God does not, as in the case of man, involve *separation,* or plurality of individuals. *Strong, p. 160.* God is one individual and *solus.* He is also a personal individual; not because He is one Person, which He is not, but, because the *manner of His subsistence* is personal. *See the famous passage Hooker, Ec. Pol., V. 51. 1: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., pp. 438, 439: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 30. 4.*

6. The term *person* as applied to the Divine, is inadequate, for it symbolizes that which transcends our experience and comprehension. But we must remember that it signifies more than a mere stage character, *dramatis persona,* if we are to avoid Sabellianism; and not a *separate individual,* if we are to avoid tri-theism. *Strong, p. 160: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., p. 33.* For a history of the word, see *Newman's Arians, ch. V. §1. 3., pp. 365 et seq: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 83-87: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, II. 3, 4.*

7. The personal distinctions in the Godhead are *real* and *eternal;* but they are *internal,* and consist with *numerical unity* of essence. The two truths, indivisible unity of essence and tri-personal subsistence, are to be held together; and the manner of holding each should be such as to allow for the other. *Richey's Truth and Counter Truth, Introd. and pp. 14, 15: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 39. esp. art. 1.*

QUESTION 65.

WHAT IS THE CATHOLIC FAITH CONCERNING DIVINE PROCESSIONS?—The Catholic Faith concerning Divine Processions, is that the Son proceeds from the Father by generation, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son by spiration. *Western forms of the Nicene and Athanas. Creeds: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 27: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 116-124: Pearson on the Creed, pp. 238-244, 252, 253, 570-577: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 5. §4: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. §§135-150.*

2. These processions are (a.) *immanent,* since their objective termini are internal to their principle: (b.) *substantial* or subsistent, since they signify a changeless movement in the Divine

essence itself—the mode of the Divine subsistence: (c.) *necessary,* for the Father cannot but generate, and the Father and the Son cannot but spirate, since the personal subsistences themselves depend upon the Divine processions. Yet we may not speak of compulsion, for the necessity is *internal.* It is the *nature* of God to generate and spirate. *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 41. 2, 5:* (d.) *eternal,* for they have neither beginning nor end. They are ever going on, yet always completed. *Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 120-122: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., p. 431:* (e.) *perfect,* since they are without change of substance or diversity. The one essence is in each procession entirely communicated. *Schouppe, §§139-144.*

3. Since these processions signify the mode of Divine subsistence and are immanent, eternal, and perfect, we may not speak of the Son as later in time than the Father, or inferior to Him, nor of the Holy Ghost as later than the Father and the Son, or inferior to Them. *The whole Three Persons are co-eternal together and co-equal. S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 42. 1, 2.*

4. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, but *in different manners* and *as*

from one principle. He proceeds from (ἐκ) the Father, through (διά, παρά) the Son; for the Father alone is the unoriginate source of the Godhead. The Son spirates the Holy Ghost because He is consubstantial with the Father, receiving His essence from the Father, and communicating it *in and with* the Father to the Holy Ghost. *Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 256-262: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 36. 2-4: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., VI. §§186-190: Pearson on the Creed, pp. 570-577.* This is the doctrine of the ancients (including such Easterns as SS. Athanasius, Basil, Cyril Alex., and John Damas), and of all portions of the Church to-day; although the *Filioque* controversy, originally one of law simply, has called forth statements from certain Eastern theologians which need charitable construction. In any case, we may not deny that there is an *eternal* procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. *Pusey's Letter to Liddon: Richey's Nic. Creed and the Filioque: Wilberforce on the H. Euch., pp. 225, 226 and note.*

QUESTION 66.

WHAT ARE THE DIVINE NOTIONS? — The Divine Notions *(notiones),* by which the Persons

are described and discriminated (Q. 62. 10), are five ; viz. innascibility, paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. *S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 32. 2-4: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., 161: Forbes' Nic. Creed, p. 124.*

2. *Innascibility, paternity,* and *spiration* pertain to the Father, Who is unorginate, begets, and spirates. *Filiation* and *spiration* pertain to the Son, Who is begotten and spirates. *Procession* pertains to the Holy Ghost, Who is spirated.

3. All of these notions except innascibility are called RELATIONS *(relationes),* because they express the manners according to which the Divine Persons subsist *with reference to each other. Paternity* and *filiation* express respectively the active and passive relations existing between the Father and the Son. *Spiration* and *procession* express respectively the active and passive relations existing between the Father and the Son on the one hand and the Holy Ghost on the other. A further distinction should be made in spiration and procession, for the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son in the same manner in which He proceeds from the Father. *Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. 154-158: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 28: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 5. §6.*

4. Three of these Relations are called PROPERTIES (*proprietates*); by which is meant the several characteristics which are peculiar to each, and by which each can be distinguished. They are *Paternity, filiation* and *procession.* In other words we distinguish the Father as the unoriginate source of the Godhead; the Son as begotten; the Holy Ghost as proceeding. *Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. 159, 160: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 40: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 5. §8: Hooker's Ec. Pol., V. 51. 1.*

5. It may aid the memory to notice that there are one Divine Nature, two processions, three properties, four relations, and five notions. *Schouppe, 162.*

QUESTION 67.

WHAT IS CIRCUMCESSION?—Circumcession (circumcessio, circumincessio, commeatio, *περιχώρησις, συμπεριχώρησις, περιεγχώρησις*) "is that property by reason of the identity of their natures *communicate* with each other. It is the internal existence of one Person in the other, without confusion of person or of personality" (S. John XIV. 9, 11). *Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 81-83: S. Thos. Sum. Th.,*

I. 42. 5: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. 163-165: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., p. 34, note g: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 5. §7.

2. The Divine Persons mutually coinhere in *action* as well as in essence. Every Divine operation proceeds equally from the Three. The reason why it is possible, none the less, to distinguish, and to speak, for example, of the Father as Creator, of the Son as Redeemer, and of the Holy Ghost as Sanctifier, is that the distinction of Persons involves a diversity of relations between each Person and Their common operations. *Wilberforce on the H. Euch., pp. 222-228: Hooker's Ec. Pol., I. 2. 2.*

3. The doctrine of Circumcession is useful (a.) to guard the truth of the Divine Unity: (b.) to teach the moral harmony, or unity of *purpose,* which must attend Divine activity;—e. g. in the plan of Redemption: (c.) to refute the error that the economy of one Person displaces that of another in this world. *Wilberforce pp. 227, 228:*

QUESTION 68.

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF SUBORDINATION? —The doctrine of Subordination, also called the doctrine of the Divine Monarchy (*μονάρχια*),

is that the manner of Divine subsistence requires us to speak of the Father as first in order, the Son as second, and the Holy Ghost as third. *Bull's Defence of the Nic. Faith, Bk. IV: Newman's Tracts Theol. and Eccles., pp. 161, 167-191: Forbes' 39 Arts. I. p. 18: Browne's 39 Arts. II. p. 67: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 33: 42. 3: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. 174: Forbes' Nic. Creed, pp. 140-143: Liddon's Bamp. Lec., pp. 202, note l, 431, 432 note n, 447: Pearson on the Creed, pp. 64-67, 569, 570: Owen's Dog. Th., ch. 5. §11: Mason's Faith of the Gospel, II. 8.*

2. It is to be observed that (a.) this doctrine expresses a truth of the Divine essence. The order is not merely economic, but real and eternal: (b.) the order is one of origin and subsistence. The Father is first because the other Two proceed from Him, and He proceeds from none; the Son second because He is begotten; the Holy Ghost third because He proceeds from the other Two: (c.) No Person is "afore or after other." The order is *logical,* not chronological. The Three are "co-eternal together": (d.) There is no inequality involved. "None is greater or less than another, but the whole Three Persons are . . . coequal."

3. The value of this doctrine is that it (a.) emphasizes the Divine Unity by teaching that there is but one principle of origin in the Trinity: (b.) guards the distinction of Persons by teaching the *manner* of Divine Unity.

CHAPTER XI.

DIVINE ECONOMIES.

Question 69.

What is Mission?—Mission, with reference to the Divine Persons, is the procession of one Person from another, having relation to some temporal effect. *Forbes' 39 Arts., I. pp. 19-21: Nic. Creed, pp. 124, 125: S. Thos. Sum. Th., I. 43: Schouppé's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. 166-173: Petav. De Dog., VIII. 4-7.*

2. Two things are involved in Mission: (a.) He Who is sent proceeds from Him Who sends (John VIII. 42). *S. Thos. I. 43. 8:* (b.) the Person sent stands in some new relation to the object to which, *terminus ad quem,* He is sent:—not that the Person changes, but the economic relation.

3. All the Divine Persons can *come* into the world (John XIV. 23). The Father does not proceed and therefore is not sent. *Pearson on the*

Creed, p. 63. The Father and the Son send, for there is a procession from Both. The Son and the Holy Ghost are sent, because Both proceed. The Holy Ghost does not send, but is sent by the Father and the Son, since He proceeds from Both.

4. The external effect of mission does not pertain to the whole Trinity except by way of efficiency. The relation of each Person to that effect is different, and the difference is such that we attribute the action to one Person. For example, it is the Son, not the Father or the Holy Ghost, Who became Incarnate. *Hooker's Ec. Pol., I. 2. 2: Schouppe, §168.*

Question 70.

What is meant by the Divine economies? —The Divine economies signify the particular external operations which revelation teaches us to attribute to the several Divine Persons. Thus the economy of the Father is creation of the world: of the Son, redemption of mankind; of the Holy Ghost, sanctification of the elect people of God. *Church Catechism: Schouppe's El. Th. Dog., Tr. VI. §§201, 202: Martensen's Dog., p. 106.*

2. The term economy, *οἰκονομία*, was used in sub-apostolic days to signify (a.) a dispensation or plan of God's government; in which sense it was especially applied to the Incarnation (cf. Ephes. I. 10): (b.) the method of reserve discernible in Divine revelation, adapted to meet the necessities of the slow understandings of men by progressive enlightenment. *Lightfoot's Apos. F'rs. Pt. II., Vol. II., p. 75.*

3. In later theology the word has had the following uses: (a.) the progressive method of Divine revelation: (b.) the special work and revelation of each Divine Person (so used in this question): (c.) certain successive dispensations or covenants in the history of God's chosen people; e. g. the Mosaic economy: (d.) the "disciplina arcani," or guarded instruction of Catechumens in the ancient Church. *Newman's Arians, pp. 49-89.*

4. A doctrine is called *economic* to signify that the truth to which it refers has not been fully revealed, because of the limitations of our understandings. The revelation is true *economically*, i. e. so far as it goes; but it is partial. A doctrine

of this sort is also called a *mystery*, *μυστήριον*, because it is inscrutable.

5. The greater part of Dogmatics is concerned with the economies of the Divine Persons. The economy of the Father is treated of in Cosmology, Angelology, and Anthropology; that of the Son in Christology; that of the Holy Ghost in Pneumatology and Ecclesiology; the consummation of them all in Eschatology.

CORRIGENDA.

Page 14	bottom:	Bushnell's	instead of	Bushrell's.
" 22,	line 6:	premises	"	premesis.
" 22,	" 6:	*praeambula*	"	*praeambulae.*
" 24,	" 3:	exegetical	"	exegtical.
" 31,	" 14:	depositum	"	despositum.
" 58,	" 13:	probable	"	propable.
" 63,	" 9:	corroborate	"	corroberate.
" 63,	" 19:	corroborates	"	corroberates.
" 71,	top:	CHAPTER VI	"	CHAPTER V.
" 76,	line 21:	Deity	"	Diety.
" 81,	" 1:	ascribing	"	ascribed.
' 118,	" 8:	*uncreate*	"	*Incarnate.*

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